US Peacemaker: Diplomatic Success in Northern Ireland [Final]

Diplomatic Success in Northern Ireland

Introduction

            The United States (US) peace process for Northern Ireland Conflict culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, one of the country’s most notable, diplomatic achievements. From the previous patterns of failed peace in Northern Ireland, the international peace process chaired by George J. Mitchell, General John de Chastelain, and Harri Holkeri, appeared doomed to fail. Nationalists, Loyalists, and the British Government were locked in stalemate over decommissioning weapons. Sinn Fein, the political branch of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), was set on not surrendering any arms before negotiations. British diplomats and Loyalist political parties such as the Ulster Democratic Party, Ulster Unionist Party, and Democratic Unionist Party were adamant that the PIRA surrender its weapons prior to negotiations. The political squabble took place amidst sporadic outbreaks of violence. Some commenters despaired about how the peace talks were going down the drain, while others cynically pointed at past failures. Yet despite all these threats to the peace process, US supervision kept negotiations on a steady course resulting in the Good Friday Agreement. The US impact does not diminish the importance of other participants. All political parties played an important role in the peace talks. However, the glue that kept the peace negotiations together early on was the US ability to pressure both sides of the conflict.

            The sides of the conflict fall into two broad categories, Nationalists and Unionists. The Nationalists were supporters of reforms towards an increasing united Ireland. The Unionists were supporters of an independent Northern Ireland connected the United Kingdom. There is an additional category of third party negotiators: the US, Great Britain, and Ireland. Great Britain and Ireland are placed under this category of third party negotiators because they served as outside negotiators to a conflict between the Ulster Protestants and Republican Catholics. Great Britain intervened early on in the conflict as a peacekeeping force between the sides.[1] However, its awkward role as a defender of order and peace placed it in favor of Unionists who wanted to keep the status quo. The same explanation can be applied to Ireland, which technically was not involved in the conflict as most of the fighting occurred in Northern Ireland. However, Ireland more often than not held Republican sympathies because the goals of PIRA aligned with Irish constitutional goals of a single, united Ireland. The obvious sympathies of both Great Britain and Ireland made organizing peace negotiations difficult if not impossible. On the other hand, the US had the benefit of being new to the Northern Ireland political scene. This benefit gave the US a clear slate and opened new room for negotiations.

            One major deterrent to peace negotiations was the early incorrect perspective of the conflict. Early works on The Troubles emphasized the religious divide of the population as a source of the sectarian violence.[2] This viewpoint was detrimental to the overall discussion about The Troubles because religious conflict is often viewed as contentious and impossible to solve. Religions are seen as rigid, inflexible doctrines that should not be infringed on by the state. Therefore, assuming religious differences were the source of the Northern Ireland Conflict puts an air of fatalism on the whole issue and obscures the underlying political problems present. A closer look into the historical background of Northern Ireland’s sectarian divisions reveals why early studies painted the issue as one of religion. First I will debunk the religious divide myth. From there we will study the actual political basis for the Northern Ireland Conflict.

            Particular emphasis will be placed on the early and later phase of the Northern Ireland Conflict. Attention will be placed on the views of different political groups present such as the British and Irish. However, the primary focus is the US in connection to the other political groups. Two US individuals were vital to the Good Friday Agreement: Bill Clinton and George J. Mitchell.

            Note that all the labels are generalizations that often leave out moderate and overlapping categories. Please keep that in mind as the labels of Nationalist, Republican, and Catholic are used interchangeably. Expect the terms Protestant and Unionists to be used interchangeably as well. In addition, there are a large number of organizations involved with different acronyms. The first time the organization is mentioned, I place its acronym in a parenthesis next to it.

The Troubles’ Origins in Politics Instead of Religion

            The Northern Ireland Conflict (also known commonly as “The Troubles”) lasted from the 1966 to 1998. Early historiography paints the conflict as a religious one of Ulster Protestants against Republican Catholics. A 1970 newsreel by ECHO demonstrates this portrayal as the film starts off with Protestant evangelical Minister, Ian Paisley, saying, “I am an uncompromising Protestant pledged to uphold the principles of the great Protestant Reformation” and then contrasts that with Republican political activist, Bernadette Devlin McAliskey, saying “It is obvious that the Unionist Party is quite prepared to set Catholic against Protestant.”[3] The film takes two people from diametrically opposing sides to polarize the issue into two camps. Two of the quotes provided in the opening also help to frame the issue as one between Catholics and Protestants. The film even sums up the conflict verbatim as “basically between men, women and children of the Catholic faith against men, women, and children of the Protestant persuasion.”[4] While this view of a religious war is grossly incorrect, it is easy to see why early observers would classify the Northern Ireland Conflict as such.

            The basis for the theory of Northern Ireland’s religious conflict comes from the history of the island. Back in 16^th century King Henry VIII broke off religious ties with the Roman Catholic Church when the Pope refused to annul Henry’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon.[5] This separation of the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church became known as the English Reformation and is associated with the larger Protestant Reformation. While Henry succeeded in converting England to Protestantism, he faced a rebellion in Ireland from Silken Thomas Fitzgerald, the 10^th Earl of Kildare. Fitzgerald opposed Henry’s break from the Roman Catholic Church and attempted to oust Henry’s English supporters from Ireland. He failed and was hung for treason on February 3, 1537.[6]

            Even though the rebellion failed, it renewed England’s attention to the area. Subsequent English kings would struggle to maintain control of the island, evident by the sporadic outbreak of rebellions. The resistance of the Irish to Protestant conversion made the process of extending control difficult. In addition, the island was a potential threat to the English mainland because it could serve as a launching pad for foreign Catholic forces, such as the Spanish during Tyrone’s Rebellion.[7] The English turned to a plantation policy of taking land from native Irish residents to give to colonists from England. One of the largest plantation efforts was the Plantation of Ulster, designed to bring the lands of Hugh O’Neill (leader of Tyrone’s Rebellion) under English control.[8] The Plantation of Ulster under King James I sowed the seeds for potential future conflict by placing Protestant colonists in close proximity to displaced Catholic natives.

            The issue of Catholicism versus Protestantism in Ireland comes up again during the Glorious Revolution, when William III of Orange was invited to England to oust the Catholic King James II. James escaped to France, but later returned to Ireland to lead an army to retake the crown. The Irish Catholics supported James because their desire to gain more political autonomy and because of James’ leniency towards Catholics during his rule. This Irish support led to the Williamite-Jacobite War in Ireland. Two notable events during the war are pertinent to our study of Ulster: the Siege of Derry and the Battle of the Boyne. The first major operation of James II and his Catholic army, the Siege of Derry, lasted from April 18, 1689 to

July 31, 1689.[9] According to the lore, the city’s governor, Robert Lundy, intended on surrendering to the James’ army, but was disposed of by the Apprentice Boys of Derry before he could. The end result was that the city successful held out until the English reinforcements broke through the blockade surrounding Derry. Thus the Apprentice Boys were immortalized in Unionist tradition as true loyal Protestants while the term Lundy came to be equated with traitors to the Protestant cause.[10] The Battle of the Boyne was a decisive victory for William on July 1690 that resulted in James leaving Ireland. Unionists celebrate this victory as a verification of Protestant existence on the island.[11]

            Although the past history between Ireland and England has all the trappings of a religious conflict, the basis of the hostility has always been political. King Henry VIII broke from the Roman Catholic Church in an attempt to gain a male heir rather than because of Protestant moralism. The Plantation of Ulster was primarily focused on stabilizing English rule over the island. William defeated James at the Battle of the Boyne in order to ensure the security his kingship. The Troubles can be looked at in a similar manner. Rather than a battle between Catholics and Protestants, the more accurate depiction would be a battle between Republicans and Unionists. Combatants and participants are strongly divided along religious lines, but underneath this exterior is a political issue. In the case of The Troubles, the political issue was the civil rights movement.

Civil Rights Movement Disintegrates into Violence

            The Northern Ireland civil rights movement of the 1960s set the stage for The Troubles. Inspired by Dr. Martin Luther King’s civil rights movement, leftists in Northern Ireland formed the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) on January 29, 1967.[12] NICRA was founded on the belief that Catholics in Northern Ireland were being unfairly discriminated against by the Protestant government. The organization had five goals: defend the basic freedom of all citizens; protect the rights of the individual; highlight all possible abuses of power; demand the guarantees for freedom of speech, assembly, and association; inform the public of their lawful rights; demand the abolition of the Special Powers Act and B-Specials.[13] Each of its five goals was geared towards winning civil rights for Catholics in Northern Ireland. The last demand of abolishing the Special Powers Act and the B-Specials were especially aimed at hated Protestant institutions. The Special Powers Act of 1922 was an emergency wartime measure that granted the state full use to take any steps deemed necessary for “preserving the peace and maintaining order.”[14] The act mirrored wartime emergency measures in other nations in its draconian legislation that suspended free speech and gave the police the power to arrest “where it is necessary.” B-Specials were a special auxiliary police force compromised entirely of Unionists and Protestants. They were seen as part of the Protestant establishment’s arm against Catholics and therefore caused friction within the community and provoked resentment among the Nationalists.

            For the first year NICRA made little progress. However, in 1968 after a “glaring case of housing misallocation,” NICRA organized several protest marches.[15] NICRA was in effect challenging the political status quo of Northern Ireland in the open through their activities. Previous issues of discrimination or bias treatment that used to elicit no response from the general public suddenly became controversial political topics. These events catalyzed the divisions in Northern Ireland’s society by dividing the country into two broad categories: reformers and conservatives. Reformers aimed to correct the unfair practices of the government, while the conservatives pledge to maintain things as is. These two categories also overlap with the Nationalist and Unionist labels. More often than not, Nationalists wanted reforms to Northern Ireland’s Government. Unionists desired to keep the situation the same. On October 5, 1968 these two aspirations clashed. The Ulster police force, also known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), physically suppressed the civil rights protest march in Derry in front of the cameras.[16] The use of physical force to put down the demonstration flared up sectarian divisions within the country. The next incident of violence, the Burntollet Bridge incident, occurred during a civil rights march in Derry on January 4, 1969. On that day a Loyalist crowd of around three hundred supplemented by off duty Ulster policemen attacked marchers with stones and iron bars.[17] Nearby RUC officers in uniform did little to stop the violence destroying whatever credibility the police force had. From then on, Republicans saw the RUC as part of the government establishment intent on keeping Unionists in power.

            The distrust towards the government and fear of Unionist violence led to the rise of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Prior to the NICRA marches, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was at a low point. The organization’s 1956 border campaign to retake Northern Ireland failed miserably. John Kelly of the PIRA’s General Headquarters staff recalled that “an armed struggle on its own was getting nowhere unless you had the political support of the population. That is why the 1956 campaign failed.”[18] Some members decided that the IRA should turn towards politics and adapt a socialist agenda to reach out to the people. However, involvement in politics broke with the previous Republican policy of abstentionism, refusing to take political representation in government. Disagreements over abstentionism divided the group in two with Marxists on one side and traditional Republicans on the other. Republican emphasis on using military force without politics to achieve goals placed it on the more extreme end of the political spectrum. This approach garnered little support at first. NICRA’s goal was to achieve reforms in Northern Ireland through civil disobedience. There was no aim to topple the Northern Ireland Government. However as the marches organized by the NICRA came under police suppression and Loyalist attack, segments of the Catholic population grew more radicalized. Violence against the civil rights marchers fed into a desire to fight back. As the violence intensified, The Troubles claimed one of its earliest victims, Samuel Devenney, a local resident of Derry. During one of the street riots in Derry on April 19, 1969, police broke into Devenney’s home and clobbered him and his family. The situation was that “earlier three or four young boys, running away from the policemen, ran … through Sammy’s house and escaped over the back wall. The police broke down the door and five or six of them proceed to batter” the whole family.[19] This infamous beating of the Devenney family in their own home by Ulster police officers further shocked the population. Mix emotions of fear and anger were brought forth. Fear in the sense that Catholics were no longer safe in their homes and anger from the injustice done to Samuel Devenney. Further fuel was added to the fire when Devenney died on July 17, 1969 and no officers were charged for his death. His funeral procession numbered into the thousands and demonstrated the community’s growing solidarity against the police.[20] The incident, as it appeared to the Catholic population, was that Ulster policemen were able to barge into any home and beat a man to death.

            The final breaking point that allowed the PIRA to gain local support occurred during the Apprentice Boys parade riots on August 12. In the context of previous events, the parade was seen as a Protestant provocation. As the parade neared the Catholic quarters of Derry, Catholic residents pelted the police line protecting the procession with stones and nails. In response, the Ulster police moved in to arrest the culprits. What followed was a massive riot that lasted for two days. The chaos spread throughout the country and ignited sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants. Amidst the chaos, the IRA hastily put together a defense force to protect Catholic areas. Although their action was limited to due to the lack of preparation, what defensive activity they did provide gained them a few supporters. On August 15, the British army was called in to act as a neutral, peacekeeping force on behalf of the Northern Ireland Government.[21] The peace brought in by the British army allowed for IRA members to reflect on recent events. Traditional Republicans within the IRA saw the riots as proof of the need to resort to force to achieve their goals. On December 28, 1969 the dissent Republicans split off from the IRA to form the Provisional IRA.[22] The original IRA was then named the Official IRA and its members were called “the Officials.” The Provisionals upheld the policy of abstentionism and uniting Ireland. Unlike in the past with the failed 1956 campaign, the PIRA now had political support among the Catholic population. This support served as a resource base to draw recruits, money and material from. What had once been an armed group operating at the fringes of society was now growing to be a major political player in Northern Ireland.

            The original goals of civil rights movement were overridden by a new policy of taking on the “British” state. The once liberal ideals of equal suffrage, fair housing, and human rights were washed away by a sea of violence. This sudden turn of events was not a complete end of the push for civil rights. Some members of the local Derry Citizen’s Action Committee (DCAC) such as John Hume continued to embrace a nonviolent struggle. In fact, Hume, a member of the Northern Ireland Parliament, later led the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and continued to insist on nonviolence.[23] Under Westminster MP, Gerry Fit, and John Hume, the Labour and Nationalists parties in Northern Ireland coalesced under the banner of the SDLP. This new party later became a major party in Northern Ireland, second to the UUP, which was the long the dominant party in country. While the SDLP remained a major political representative of the Nationalists throughout The Troubles, its platform of political reform was drowned out by the violence of the 1970s.

            Radicalization and polarization led to the rise of extremist dialogue. NICRA originally did not image a revolt against the government. The organization’s ultimate goal, to develop equality for Catholics, went hand in hand with the desire to instill pride in the Nationalists community. Neither was aimed at physical coercion. Civil rights activist Nell McCafferty supports this notion when she recalled, “We were not marching for a united Ireland.”[24] As evident by these statements, most Catholics were not IRA Republicans aiming for a single united Ireland. However, there were IRA members participating in NICRA organized events. Their presence fed into Unionist fears of a Republican undercover operation designed to takeover Northern Ireland through political means. Thus, by their mere presence, IRA Republicans managed to inadvertently hijack the political goals of NICRA. The new goal of mainstream Nationalists became not of reform, but of a united Irish state. The only thing missing from this equation was their old foe, the British Army, who at that moment arrived to restore order.

British Policy in Ireland: Home Rule to the early Troubles

            Britain’s relationship with Ireland fluctuated throughout the 20^th century. After going to great efforts to maintain political control of the island for over three hundred years, Britain began to transfer governance over to Ireland. Britain’s political scene had changed so that there was increasing sympathy for Ireland within parliament. The first steps towards greater Irish autonomy were the Home Rule Bills. While the first two failed to pass, the third Irish Home Rule Bill of 1914 passed. However, the bill was put on hold because Britain was preoccupied with the outbreak of World War I. Taking advantage of Britain’s diverted attention, the Irish Republican Brotherhood staged an uprising on April 24, 1916.[25] While the uprising at first had little public support, the execution of the rebellion leaders rapidly changed the public perception of the incident. The rebellion shelved the Home Rule Bill and brought back British martial law to the island.

            By all appearances the Home Rule Bill for Ireland look finished. However, public support for the rebel leaders led to a landslide victory for the Irish Republican Brotherhood’s political party, Sinn Fein, in the 1918 general elections. The party won seventy-three of the one hundred and five seats available and refused to participate in London’s parliament. Instead the seventy-three members convened in Dublin on January 21, 1919 to start “Dáil Eireann,” the new parliament of an independent Ireland. What followed was the Irish War for Independence, which pitted the newly formed Irish Republican Army against the British Army and its auxiliary police force. By the war’s end, Ireland was partitioned and the Irish Free State was born. Britain from then on took a “hands off” approach towards Ireland.

            The British kept out of Ireland’s politics for close to half a century, but were thrust back onto the scene into restore order during the chaos of the 1969 Northern Ireland Riots. Northern Ireland’s parliament, Stormont, requested British assistance in maintaining order. The British Government complied out of the necessity to stabilize the Northern Ireland Government. While Ireland had gained independence in 1921, the partition left Northern Ireland still a part of the United Kingdom (UK). Thus, Britain was still responsible for aiding Northern Ireland despite having left “Ireland.” However, coming to the aid of Stormont placed the British on the side of the Unionists. Maintaining order was the equivalent of maintaining the status quo. Keeping to the status quo under rode the main efforts behind NICRA and left the core issues of the Northern Ireland Conflict unresolved.

            The British Government was in a difficult situation of trying to grant the civil rights that NICRA demanded, while at the same time placating the Unionists. They knew that the recent explosion of violence had a cause and that there were “serious Catholic grievances that had to be addressed.”[26] Thus, a UK Representative Office was set up in Stormont with its first member Oliver Wright. Wright was there to ensure that the Stormont Government addressed the grievances of the Catholic community through adequate reforms. One of the main problems was that every reform intended for the Catholic community incensed the Unionists who saw it as capitulation to the enemy. Unionists had the added threat of voting power in the British electorate since Northern Ireland is officially part of the UK. Thus, there was more incentive for Britain to support the Unionists than the Catholics. For the Unionists, staying connected to the UK was paramount to their survival. The riots had demonstrated that Catholics would use violence to achieve their goals. This polarizing situation left the British in an unclear role.

            The army had already been committed to area. There were no other instructions besides keeping the peace. That peace had already been completed in dramatic fashion on the streets of Derry. However, the effect was temporary at best. Nothing short of reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics would stop another riot from breaking out. Soldiers were deployed militarily for an issue that was ultimately a police action. Thus, on the Orange Day Parades in 1970, the British army found itself in the same role as the RUC. Like the RUC, they were stuck trying to separate the Protestant parade goers from the Catholic population. Their efforts were for naught as Catholics and Protestants fought in a wave of riots that engulfed the country once more. The scale of the riots stretched the army to the limit and left the Catholics of the Short Strand in Belfast exposed to Loyalist attack. Despite repeated calls for the British army’s assistance, the soldiers refused to intervene.[27] Instead the PIRA responded to the call protecting the Short Strand and its iconic St. Matthew’s Church from Loyalist attack. The gunfight between the PIRA and the Loyalists left three dead and was a huge propaganda victory for the PIRA. The chaos of the riots combined with Unionists fears of a resurgent IRA left the Stormont Government determined to put a show of force. Unfortunately for the British forces they were to be used in this show of force.

            On July 1970, British soldiers of the Royal Scots sealed off the Lower Falls area to search for IRA weapons.[28] The Lower Falls was actually the territory of the Official IRA, not the PIRA that the government was actually searching for, but that was unknown to government authorities. This lack of prior research indicated how unprepared the British Government was in dealing with Northern Ireland’s political background. They let Stormont deploy their troops to search for a paramilitary organization hidden among the populace. The result was a catastrophe. The search led to a riot, which in turn led to a massive gun battle between British forces and the Official IRA. All of this occurred within the residential area of the Catholic community. The CS gas and gunfire terrorized the local population. In addition, a curfew was in place with soldiers threatening that anyone opening a door or standing outside would be shot. After the gunfight, two Unionists politicians from Stormont were given a tour of the Lower Falls on the back of an army Landrover.[29] The incident turned the Catholic community against the British and won the PIRA supporters.

            Prior to this horrendous public relations disaster, the British were in an excellent position to prevent a resurgent PIRA. Despite winning some support during the 1969 Northern Ireland Riots, the IRA was in complete turmoil due to an internal dispute between the Marxists and Republicans. This dispute resulted in the Officials and the Provisionals. The introduction of British forces had the support of both Stormont and the Catholic population. Considering the long history between Catholic Irish and Protestant Britons, this support for British troops might appear contradictory. However, the circumstances demonstrated that the Catholic residents had good reason to welcome the British army with open arms. Rioting had torched numerous Catholic houses and left thousands of refugees. There was widespread exhaustion among the population following consecutive days of riots. In addition, the British cut off contact with Ireland and kept it at an arms length for over thirty years, long enough for the past British-Irish antagonisms to be a fleeting memory for younger Catholics. The sudden arrival of the British army to quell the rioting made them appear as saviors. British troops often recall affectionately the reception they received. Trooper “Dave” felt “like a knight in shining armor” and remembers being given a near endless supply of tea, buns, and sandwiches by local Catholic residents.[30] Even more telling is the awe and respect soldiers inspired among the youth. Gerard Hodgkins and Hugh McMonagle, two Catholic youths, both remember how they were enraptured by the army’s presence. Hodgkins was mesmerized by British soldiers and dismisses any British-Irish antagonism in his thoughts as a child. McMonagle even served as an errand boy for British soldiers.

            The visit by British Home Secretary, James Callahan, to Derry further portrayed the Catholic support for the British. Shortly after the British army arrived to quell the riots, Callahan arrived in Northern Ireland on August 28, 1969 to visit Derry.[31] A large crowd of Nationalists, eager to present their case to the British Government, came to greet him. John Hume was one of the greeters who welcomed the British Home Secretary. Hume hoped that Callahan “was bringing the solution with him.”[32] Video of the visit illustrated just how thick and tumultuous the crowd was. Callahan fondly recalled, “the most touching moment was when a women knelt down on the pavement in order to kiss my hand. I’ve never been so touched in my life.”[33] The whole trip and its reception by the Nationalist community in Derry showed the wonderful public support the British had in at the start of The Troubles. Callahan could even take the risk of traveling into Derry’s center with only two guards to escort him. Year’s later, no British official would dare travel into Nationalists areas without heavily armed escorts.

            Despite both a weakened IRA and good public relations, the British failed to solve the core issues of The Troubles. Oliver Wright believed that the solution was just within sight, stating “We we’re making progress and I’m quite sure that at the time the Catholic community saw the British Government as their friend, trying to do their best to ensure that Stormont introduced the reforms that they wanted.”[34] What Wright failed to account for was the political situation of Northern Ireland’s Unionists and the army’s limitations. The tragic miscalculation would lead the British to spend the following years of “The Troubles” battling the newly formed PIRA.

Ireland’s Early Contribution

            The Irish Government contributed to the Northern Ireland Conflict merely through its existence. In 1921 after the Irish War of Independence (also known as the Anglo-Irish War by the British), the island was partitioned into Ireland and Northern Ireland. Ireland was to be registered as the Irish Free State. Northern Ireland remained part of the UK.[35] This arrangement angered some members of the IRA who promptly broke off from the traitorous Irish Free State and formed their own group called the Republicans. What followed was a ten-month civil war that pitted former IRA members against each other. In the end, the Irish Free State won the civil war, but the Republican dream of a fully united Ireland continued. The Official IRA and the PIRA originated from these Republican ideals.

            The presence of the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland) served as a constant source of fear for the Unionists. The original goals of Irish independence involved the complete independence of all of Ireland. Only military constraints and negotiations reduced the demands of IRA to the twenty-six southern counties. Thus, there was always the possibility that the Irish Free State would later forcibly attempt to take Northern Ireland. In addition, the sectors of Northern Ireland held a substantial Catholic or Nationalist population. These Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland served as a possible fifth column for the Irish. Unionists viewed the increase in public disturbances during the 1960s and 1970s as part of an Irish ploy to destabilize Northern Ireland.

            Jack Lynch, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from 1966-1973 and 1977-1979, confirmed Unionist fears in his televised speech on August 1969. Lynch stated, “the unification of the national territory can provide the only permanent solution for the problem [Catholic-Protestant antagonisms], it is our intention to request the British Government to enter into early negotiations with the Irish Government to review the present constitutional position of the six Counties of Northern Ireland.”[36] The phrase “reunification of national territory” was particularly disturbing for Unionists, since it brought up the idea of combining Ireland and Northern Ireland into one country. If such a reunification occurred the Unionists would become the minority in an overwhelming Nationalist country. Further damage was caused by the mention of setting up “field hospitals adjacent to Derry and at other points along the border.” These hospitals were dedicated to treating Nationalists, enemies of the Unionists establishment. Unionists saw the Irish as coming to the aid of Catholic instigators responsible for recent civil disturbances. Considering the timing of the broadcast and the outbreak of riots, Unionists assumed the worst: an Irish invasion of the North was imminent.

            The Unionist feared Irish invasion never occurred. Neither did any reunification effort materialized. The Irish Army was marched right up to the border and stopped to assemble field hospitals. There was no armed effort to protect the Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. Only aid via medical and other supplies were provided for the evacuees. Nationalists pointed to Jack Lynch’s failure to support the Catholics in Northern Ireland as evidence of his weakness as prime minister. Derry rioter, John McCourt, mockingly stated, “We felt that he [Lynch] did stand idly by. You know the song. Jack Lynch had an army, had ten thousand men, he marched them up to the border and marched them back again. That’s the way Jack Lynch’s contribution to the battle is remembered.”[37] Lynch promptly backed off from the implications of televised speech and reassured the Northern Ireland Government and the British Government that he had no intention of reunifying Ireland.

            Lynch was in a tight spot. As a moderate he was keen on avoiding violence between North and South Ireland. Thus, he stuck to the partition keeping out of Northern Ireland affairs. With the outbreak of the riots, Lynch had to demonstrate that he was doing something for his “people in the North.” He opted to avoid a full on confrontation by opening field hospitals to the consternation of some in the Irish Government. Three Irish Ministers actively voiced their complaints to Lynch about his handling of the Northern Ireland Riots. Neil Blaney, Irish Minister of Agriculture, and Kevin Boland, Minister for Local Government, both were militantly anti-partionists. Charles Haughey, Irish Minister of Finance, supported them. This opposition group became caught up in a controversy involving arms shipments to the north. All three ministers were alleged to have illegally imported arms to Northern Ireland for Nationalists. On May 6, 1970 Blaney and Haughey were dismissed from the Irish Government, while Boland resigned.[38] Despite the careful move by Lynch to avoid a full on war, the mere presence of the Irish Army at the border was enough to frighten Unionists.

            Regardless of what the Irish did, they were seen as acting in favor of the Nationalist community. This Unionist paranoia extended into diplomacy and governance. Any efforts by the British authorities to negotiate with the Irish and any effort by the Irish Government to participate in Northern Ireland politics were viewed with suspicion. The actual reality was that the Irish Government was saddling the middle ground between Nationalist fervor and self-preserving indifference. However, for hardline Unionists this layer of complexity to the Irish Government meant nothing. They were determined to keep the Irish out of Northern Ireland affairs to ensure that the partition would remain. Thus, many of Irish Agreements with Northern Ireland or the UK were an uphill struggle against Unionists determined not to give an inch. Even efforts towards reconciliation by moderate Unionist members were seen as a major threat to country’s existence.

Unionists Holding Onto Ulster

            Unionists viewed their connection with the UK as vital to their identity. Besides serving as a significant source of pride, the connection with the UK has historically provided stability and safety. The threat posed by Catholics to new Protestant settlers made the settlers dependent on the union for security. This security is evident in Britain’s method of dealing with Irish Rebellions. English forces of William III relieved the Loyalists besieged in Derry and ensured the existence of Protestants and their allies. Further Irish Rebellions against both the Crown and the settlers were put down with military and police action. Providing security for the settlers was aligned with efforts by the British to retain political control over Ireland. Thus, the Protestant benefits went hand in hand with Catholic discrimination, strengthening the settler’s ties to the UK.

            Northern Ireland’s Unionism outlasted Britain’s unionistic beliefs. The British Government had a change of heart on the Anglo-Irish problem during the later half of the 19^th Century and early 20^th Century. There was a brewing movement for Irish Home Rule and the British Government introduced several Home Rule Bills that failed to pass. Unionists saw the Home Rule Bills as a threat to their sovereignty and identity. Over two centuries of Protestant connection with the mainland was under attack. The difference was that this time the threat of Ireland’s independence came from London’s parliament at Westminster instead of Irish Republicans. Realizing the increased likelihood of a successful Home Rule Bill issued from above, Sir Edward Carson, a Unionist barrister, campaigned against the Home Rule Bill. In 1912 Carson and over hundred thousand Unionists signed the Ulster Covenant, a document declaring Unionist loyalty to King George V and their intention to defeat the Home Rule Bill by “using all means which may be found necessary.”[39] The Unionists meant their word and demonstrated how far they were willing to go by forming the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), an around hundred thousand militia ready to prevent any British enforcement of the Home Rule Bill. In response, the Irish to the south formed their own militia known as the Irish Volunteers.

            While Britain at first ignored the Ulster Covenant of 1912, the government was unable to ignore the armed militias. A civil war appeared imminent. The civil war was prevented by the outbreak of the First World War. The First World War provided some breathing room for the British government to create an alternative Home Rule Bill. The 1920 Government of Ireland Act provided an option to opt out of Home Rule for Northern Ireland. This option was put in place to please the Ulster Protestants. As a result, Ireland was partitioned between North and South.

            After the partition, Northern Ireland was granted its own government that while still linked to the UK, was granted a large amount of autonomy. This period of Northern Ireland governance was known as “devolution of powers” or “devolution” for short.[40] The Westminster Parliament in London was responsible for taxation, foreign affairs, defense, and certain major UK services. Northern Ireland’s parliament, Stormont, was in charge of “law, order and good government.” Stormont had its own prime minister, police force and electorate. Unionists remained the dominant party in the government with a long line of prime ministers all part of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). Both governments developed an unspoken rule of nonintervention into each other’s affairs. However, that changed in 1972 following the dramatic explosion of violence throughout Northern Ireland. With the conflict escalating to higher stages and more British soldiers getting killed every day, the British Government introduced Direct Rule. Under Direct Rule by Westminster, the Northern Ireland Parliament was discontinued and the powers of the executive and legislative were in the hands of Westminster.[41] This situation of Direct Rule would remain for almost the entirety of the conflict.

            The past predicament of the desire of Northern Ireland Unionists to remain in the UK highlights the unique political role Unionists played in Anglo-Irish relations. Despite the desire of Britain to bury past Anglo-Irish antagonism, Unionists continued to serve as a constant reminder for the British Government of the need to retain control of Northern Ireland. Unionists demanded to be part of the UK whether or not Westminster agreed. The connection to the UK ensured that Unionists are British citizens, which are under protection of the British Government. Thus, the British were obliged to protect the Unionist even though they were a self-governing entity.

            Unionist desired to retain control of Northern Ireland conflicted with the goal of NICRA. This political conflict between the status quo and reform was the true foundation of The Troubles. That the British forces returned to Ireland to fight against the PIRA was just one factor in a chain of political events. The basic zero-sum thinking in Northern Ireland was that a victory or reform for Catholics or Nationalists was a loss for the Unionist community. Thus, when the Government of Northern Ireland came under the more moderate Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill, a major storm was brewing.

            NICRA’s protests for equal rights and fair treatment came at an opportune moment in Unionist politics. However, NICRA’s actions actually helped to inflame Unionism in Northern Ireland rather than achieve reform. The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland at the time was Terence Marne O'Neill, a moderate Unionist. O’Neill attempted to reconcile the separation between Nationalist and Unionist communities in Northern Ireland. In order to improve relations with the Irish, he invited Ireland’s Prime Minister, Sean Lemass to Belfast in January 1964 for talks.[42] This invitation broke with Unionist tradition of ignoring the Ireland and was met with considerable scorn. Reactionary figures such Ian Paisley and other Unionist government members leapt at the opportunity to portray O’Neill as a Lundy or traitor to the Unionist cause. However, that did not prevent O’Neill from having a second meeting with Lemass on February 1964. O’Neill was able to weather the reactionary storm through the political support of his party and moderates. Another invitation was sent to the next Irish Prime Minister, Jack Lynch, in December of 1967.[43] The two prime ministers first met at Stormont, then Dublin. There appeared to be some hope of establishing friendly relations with the open talks. However, the development of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement changed the political landscape.

             The sudden rise in political activism among Nationalists was matched by an equally large rise in activism among Unionists. In an effort to contain the situation, the police were brought in to restore order. What followed was the infamous police suppression of NICRA on October 5, 1968. This situation placed O’Neill between NICRA activists and reactionary Unionists. He had to retain control of Northern Ireland by using the police to suppress the Protestors, but at the same time he had to introduce reforms to solve the crisis at its foundations. Thus, he introduced the Five Point Reform Programme to appease NICRA activists. The reform included housing allocation based on need, an ombudsman to investigate complaints against the government, and the abolishment of the special powers act. However, a critical piece of legislation missing from the reforms was NICRA’s demand of “one man one vote” in elections.[44] Offering such reforms after demonstrations by NICRA made O’Neill look weak to Unionists. The previous hardliners who criticized O’Neill again blasted him for giving into the Catholic threat. Minister of Commerce, Brian Faulkner, and Minister of Health and Social Services, William Morgan, both resigned in response to O’Neill’s Five Point Reform Programme. Thirteen other Unionist parliament members also demanded a change in party leadership.[45] For the Catholics and civil rights protestors the reforms did not achieve enough. No police were disciplined for their behavior on October 5^th. Unable to achieve the reconciliation he hoped, O’Neill resigned on April 28, 1969. His replacement was Prime Minister James Chichester-Clark. Both sides, Unionists and Nationalists, were left unsatisfied and this set the stage for the next escalation, the Northern Ireland Riots.

            The Northern Ireland Riots further polarized the Unionists. Seeing the increasing chaos, many Protestant citizens of Northern Ireland turned to hardline Unionists. This political shift guaranteed that compromise was no longer viable for politicians. Unfortunately for Unionists Government officials, there was a policy of reform thrust upon them by the British government. The British Government viewed the conflict as originating from discrimination practiced by Stormont. Under the recommendations of James Callahan, the British Government encouraged Stormont to press forward more reforms through their UK Representative Office at Stormont. Regrettably for the British, their early efforts to avoid a full and total commitment to Northern Ireland by working through a Representative Office backfired when Unionists opposed the British proposed reforms. What reforms did manage to get through Stormont was missing significant pieces of legislation or was watered down. Predictably the demands of both Nationalists and Unionists continued to be left unfulfilled.

            There was considerable resistance from the Unionists to prevent more “victories” for Nationalists. Ian Paisley remained a prominent reaction figure against any British changes, including Direct Rule. He attacked James Callahan’s visit to Derry, calling Callahan an “ally of the bogside [Derry] rebels, an encourager of the Roman Catholic Church and its dictation here in Northern Ireland politics. We look upon Mr. Callahan as a man who is prepared to give … a blank check to those who are out to destroy this province.”[46] The Stormont government likewise had its own form of reactionary politics. The long-dominant UUP now faced a division within its own ranks. Paisley’s radical announcement won him significant support. In 1971, he and Desmond Boal, former UUP parliamentarian, formed the new Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).[47] The DUP would grow in strength to rival the UUP and often challenged any attempts at reform. The political wrangling went on while the country spiraled out of control. British troops, while successful at stopping the riots of 1969, were less successful in preventing riots in subsequent years. A new element, the PIRA, was brought into the mix to further intensify the conflict. They began coordinated attacks on the RUC and British security forces. Bombings and shootings targeted at policemen and British troops confirmed Unionist fears of a resurgent IRA.

            In the face of escalating violence and disintegrating order, Chichester-Clark stepped down on March 1971.[48] He was replaced by Brian Faulkner, a more unyielding Unionist. Faulkner’s first move was to get tough on the PIRA. He introduced internment, arrest without trial, as a means of separating the PIRA from the local populace. However, the mass arrests failed to capture the PIRA leadership and angered the Nationalist population. That meant little to the Unionists who were delighted that the government was finally cracking down on the terrorists. This one-sided view of the conflict contributed to its duration. Until Unionists were able to negotiate with both the British Government and the Nationalists, the core issues at hand would remain unresolved.

            The explosion of PIRA attacks in the 1970s convinced some Unionist to take matters into their own hands. They formed armed defense associations to take on the PIRA and its allies. Collectively all these groups came to be known as Loyalist paramilitaries. These Loyalist paramilitary groups would later develop their own political wings in a manner similar to the IRA. One of the most prominent of these paramilitary organizations was the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Formed in 1966 by Augustus Andrew Spence, the organization was named after the Ulster Volunteer Force in the early 20^th century that formed under Sir Edward Carson.[49] Unlike the original UVF the new one had more violent secretarian goals. Spence was arrested earlier in October 1966 for the murder of two Catholics, neither of whom was involved with the IRA. His vision of a resurgent IRA, while at first dimissed by the O’Neill government, later made him a hero for hardline Unionists. Loyalists paramilitaries created another dimension of the conflict between illegal, sectarian paramilitary organizations. This complex web of interactions involving, Nationalists, PIRA, Official IRA, Loyalists, British Security Forces, RUC, Unionists, and Irish made the conflict appear impossible to resolve.

US Part of the Picture

            Throughout the beginnings of The Troubles, the US primarily ignored the issue. The problem was one for the British to solve. The indifference of the US benefited the PIRA. Its members could freely travel into the states to collect funds and more importantly, weapons. Early on in the conflict the PIRA lacked effective channels of communication state side. On December 1969, months after being caught off guard by the 1969 Northern Ireland Riots, the PIRA sent two of its agents, John Kelly and Sean Keenan, to establish a support network in the US.[50]  Their early efforts failed because of the pride of US Republicans (Not the political party) against Free State money. However, in 1970 the IRA’s Adjutant-General, David O’Conell, went to New York to set up an arms network.[51] With some PIRA funding, he succeeded in buying weapons in the US. The whole purchasing process was easy. Only a driver’s license was required for proof of identity.

            The US has a history with Republicanism in spite of its major Protestant leanings. Waves of Irish immigration throughout the 19^th century created Irish communities in the Northeastern portions of the US. These immigrants from Ireland brought over Irish Republicanism. Particular areas of strong Irish presence were cities such as Boston and New York City. In New York City alone, there was about 203,740 foreign born Irish immigrants in 1860.[52] From these cities, Irish Americans supported various IRA movements. One particular organization worth noting was the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID). Martin Flannery, an IRA veteran of the Irish War of Independence, founded NORAID in 1970.[53] The organization served as a financial base for the PIRA up to the present day. In addition to finances, there was significant political clout held by the Irish American businesses and politicians. These special interest groups lobbied the US government for pro-Irish legislation.

            During the outbreak of The Troubles, the US was embroiled in the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War continued to grab the headlines until its end in 1975.[54] In addition, there was the Watergate Scandal in 1972 that led to President Nixon’s resignation in 1974.[55] These major political events overshadowed The Troubles. However with the escalation of the conflict in the 1970s and lobbying from Irish Americans, the issue could no longer be ignored. On August 30, 1977 US President Jimmy Carter addressed The Troubles in his Northern Ireland Statement on US Policy.[56] Carter was careful not to take a side on the conflict.  He stated that the US has “close ties of friendship with both parts of Ireland and with Great Britain.” By including the British, Carter avoided appearing biased towards the Irish. He further supports the British by stating, “I ask all Americans to refrain from supporting with financial or other aid organizations whose involvement in this violence delays the day when the people of Northern Ireland can live together in harmony.” This comment was a direct reference to NORAID and other PIRA support groups. The presence of PIRA support groups within the US across international borders frustrated British officials. There were vast quantities of firearms ranging from “Belgian FN semi-automatic rifles to M1 carbines” being brought into Northern Ireland from the US for use against British forces. Thus, Carter’s pledge that federal law enforcement agencies would “apprehend and prosecute any who violate US laws in this regard” served to relieved British authorities. Ultimately, the speech acknowledged the conflict, but stuck to the US stance of “impartiality.” Carter had no desire to intervene in Northern Ireland’s affairs.

            The speech did little to placate the reality of the situation for British troops. The sudden influx of higher quality weapons was followed by a rise in casualties. The British suffered some of its highest fatalities in 1972 with over one hundred soldiers killed.[57] Some weapons such the Armalite rifles were clearly delivered from the US. Anglo-American relations further deteriorated in 1979 following Prime Minister Margret Thatcher’s dispute with President Jimmy Carter over the US refusal of Britain’s Ruger firearms order.[58] Being refused firearms for police protection while knowing that the PIRA was freely purchasing US firearms smacked of hypocrisy to Thatcher. To further strain international relations New York Governor Hugh Carey invited Humphrey Atkins, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to New York to discuss the Northern Ireland Conflict. Thatcher was irritated and stated that, “she was not in the habit of discussing the internal problems of the US with the Americans and they should not attempt to do so with us.”[59] Luckily for Thatcher the next President was more cooperative with British efforts.

            Reagan was the opposite of Carter. As a conservative he was more in line with Thatcher’s policies and less pressured by the Democratic Irish American political groups. He focused on pushing forward investigations on possible PIRA weapon shipments. The FBI formed the “PIRA Squad” that was in charge of keeping watch over possible PIRA members in the US. Soon afterwards in 1982 the FBI arrested four suspected PIRA members. Among the four was PIRA Commanding Officer, Gabriel Megahey, who was put charge of purchasing surface to air missiles.[60] In 1985 the FBI arrested another PIRA gun smuggler named Liam Ryan as he was preparing to leave for Ireland.[61] That was followed up by another arrest in 1989 of three IRA engineers that were trying to develop anti aircraft missiles.[62] Aside from arresting weapons smugglers, the FBI was also observing NORAID. A January, 1989 report given to the Director of the New York FBI branch confirmed NORAID responsibility for a planned demonstration against Britain’s Princess Diana.[63] The report further discussed the security detail in charge of protecting Princess Diana against possible “Irish terrorists” at the Brooklyn Academy of Music. These actions improved Anglo-American relations and proved to the British that Americans were finally getting tough on PIRA. The increasing US pressure on the PIRA during the 1980s also coincided with new Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.[64] The agreement formalized cooperation between British and Irish governments. Now Britain, Ireland, and the US were all active participants in the struggle to subdue the PIRA.

Path to Peace Long and Tumultuous

            The Troubles raged on throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Even the overwhelming force deployed by Thatcher was unable to subdue the PIRA. Her strong stance against the terrorists backfired with the death of Bobby Sands in 1981. The Republican prisoner went on a hunger strike in defiance of British attempts to categorize him as regular criminal instead of a prisoner of war. Prior to his death he was elected as a member of parliament of Fermanagh-South Tyrone. Therefore his death created a political windfall for the PIRA.[65] Yet at the same time, the PIRA could not dislodge the British. New British strategies during this period known as the “twilight war” were geared towards espionage and intelligence gathering. The British strategies were placing considerable strain on the PIRA organizational structure. “Supergrass” informants were pinpointing other PIRA members for the British security forces. The futility of the conflict encouraged some members of the PIRA to seek possible peace alternatives.

            The political wing of the PIRA, Sinn Fein, drove the peace process among Republicans. The traditional IRA creed has long been one of an armed struggle against the British. Politics was usually left at the wayside as any political positions that were achieved were often undermined by abstentionism. However, in early 1980s the PIRA shifted towards a new model dubbed the “Armalite and the ballot box” by Republican Danny Morrison.[66] Instead of abstentionism, Sinn Fein would participate in political talks and act as the political arm of the PIRA. This new model acknowledged the increasing role of Sinn Fein to the PIRA. Sinn Fein’s rise in politics also demonstrated its influence among the Nationalist community. The political party later competed the established SDLP for the nationalist vote. Gerry Adams, elected President of Sinn Fein on December 13, 1983, would later lead the PIRA to peace negotiations.[67]

            The British too were seeking a political solution to the conflict. They first aimed to squeeze the PIRA by attaining the cooperation of both Irish and American governments. Reagan, a conservative like Thatcher, was willing to cooperate with the British. The Americans stepped up their activities in the 1980s as evident by the string of arrests. However while the Americans could easily arrest PIRA weapon smugglers, tracking the massive supply of money was another issue. The money was donated to organizations such as NORAID to aid the Nationalists in Ireland. Unlike weapons, which are easy to confiscate, money given via donations are hard to track, especially once it leaves the country.[68]

            Ireland cooperated with the British by apprehending PIRA members in the Republic of Ireland. As discussed earlier, there was already a preexisting pattern of Ireland suppressing the IRA during the Irish Civil War. This extended to The Troubles as well as to the present. The Irish police, the Grada Siochána, were given free reign to search for illegal firearms through the Firearms Act of 1925.[69] In March 28, 1973 the Irish Navy arrested a PIRA member, Joe Cahill, and confiscated his boat, Claudia. The Claudia was an arms shipment with “250 rifles, 240 small arms, and a quantity of anti-tank mines and explosives.”[70] The arrests of Seamus Twomey, the PIRA’s replacement chief of staff, and Kevin Mallon, the PIRA Tyrone leader, followed the capture of Joe Cahill. Cooperation between the British and Irish Governments was formalized in the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. The agreement stated, “with a view to enhancing cross-border co-operation on security matters, the Conference shall set in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by Commissioner of the Grada Siochána and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.”[71] This new security cooperation soon proved its worth with the seizure of two Libyan arms caches on January 1986 at Roscommon and Sligo in Ireland.[72] Yet like the Americans, the Irish Grada Siochána had a difficult time preventing the PIRA’s monetary aid from abroad. With both the Americans and the Irish involved against the PIRA internationally and the British security forces fighting the PIRA locally, the PIRA were backed into a corner.

            Next the British opened up communications through back channels with the PIRA. Similar early political negotiations fell apart during the 1970s. However this time with PIRA shifting towards political activism and war weariness increasing among the populace, peace discussions were more forthcoming. Still, negotiating through the complex political web required considerable diplomatic finesse. Most talks remained secret because the public would be horrified to learn that the government was talking to terrorists. British secret talks with Sinn Fein were through an unnamed individual known as, “The Contact.” With communications in place and a peace talk in the works, the British government turned to providing incentives for the PIRA to negotiate. These incentives took the form of encouraging statements given by government officials. Peter Brooke, the new Northern Ireland Secretary described the military defeat of the PIRA as “difficult to envisage” in an interview with journalist Derek Henderson.[73] He then went to discuss how the British retreat from Cyprus was an example of how the British could be capable of renegotiating past statements. Brooke again appealed towards peace in his 1990 speech at the Whitbread restaurant in London. He stated, “the British government has no selfish or strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland: our role is to help, enable and encourage. Britain’s purpose is not to occupy, but ensure democratic debate.”[74] These conciliatory efforts served as the carrot, while the pressure applied internationally through police action served as the stick. Sure enough the stick and carrot was producing some peace dialogue. Gerry Adams reported that Brooke’s remarks suggested, “possibilities worth exploring,” although this should be taken with a grain of salt considering the cautious nature of Sinn Fein.[75] However, this was soon followed by the resignation of Margaret Thatcher. With her departure came new opportunities for the next Prime Minister, John Major, to start afresh.

            More importantly, Sinn Fein was having secret talks with John Hume of the SDLP. The SDLP served as a moderate Nationalist party that originally opposed Sinn Fein. On March 23, 1986 Sinn Fein and the SDLP delegates met for the first time at St. Gerard’s.[76] Both groups were brought together to cooperate towards common Nationalists goals. Although there continued to be major disagreements between Sinn Fein and SDLP, the meetings served to help broaden Sinn Fein’s political network. John Hume’s connections to Irish and American governments served as lines of communication for Sinn Fein. These new networking opportunities for Sinn Fein paved the way for Gerry Adams visit to US.

            After some more political wrangling for the next few years, a major peace initiative came in 1993 with the Downing Street Declaration. Signed by British Prime Minister, John Major, and Irish Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds, the declaration affirmed the commitment of both governments to pursue a peace process involving the “cooperation of people, North and South, representing both traditions in Ireland.”[77] The peace would be achieved by respecting both communities present, Nationalists and Unionists. To entice Unionists, the Irish Government offered to change the Irish constitution to “fully reflect the principle of consent in Northern Ireland.” To place pressure on Sinn Fein, the Declaration stated that only “democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods … are free to join in the dialogue.” The challenge was for the PIRA to stop their attacks if Sinn Fein wanted to be invited to the peace talks. To no surprise, the negotiations became stalled on arguments over the document and squabbling over clashing political ideologies. Gerry Adams complained about the ambiguity of the document saying that because of “confusions and contradictions … there was an obvious need for clarification.”[78] The British responded to Adams requests for clarification on May 1994 with a “Statement by the Northern Ireland Office.”[79] The statement reprimanded the PIRA and Sinn Fein for unjustifiable, continuing violence. Furthermore, the document accused Sinn Fein of “playing for time” while “continuing to rob people of their lives.” The peace process remained stalled until sudden American intervention.

Clinton’s Peace Campaign Breaks the Status Quo

            President Bill Clinton ushered in a new era of US international peacemaking diplomacy. Through his initiatives two peace processes were passed, the Oslo Peace Accords and the Belfast Good Friday Agreement. Although the Oslo Peace Accords collapsed shortly after the death of major players involved, the Belfast Good Friday Agreement still holds in place. Before he was elected, Clinton had already decided to break from the US status quo and participate in Northern Ireland politics. On April 1992 at a Democratic forum on Irish issues, Clinton pledged to appoint a peace envoy for Northern Ireland and support a visa for Gerry Adams. Such assurances went against the typical American policy on Northern Ireland. The standard was to deal with PIRA terrorists domestically, while ignoring the political issue internationally. Indeed Clinton’s promises even baffled his aides. Nancy Soderberg, the President’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Staff Director of the National Security Council, remarked, “I didn’t think we were ready to do it [commit to Northern Ireland].”[80] After Clinton won the presidency, the lobby group New Irish Agenda asked that he keep to his election promises. To further back the lobbyist effort was corporate support from Bill Flynn of Mutual of America Life Insurance Company and Chuck Feeney of Duty Free Shoppers Ltd.[81] The result: on January 29, 1994 President Bill Clinton granted Gerry Adams a “limited duration” visa.

            Even though Adams’ trip to the US was only for a few days, the reception he received was enormous. In his account of the events, Adams’ claimed that his popularity was aided by Britain’s “hysterical handling of the issue.”[82] Though that was perhaps part of the story, the more likely reason for his rise in US popularity was the extensive work done by the New Irish Agenda. The lobbying group managed to get a full-page advertisement in the New York Times advocating for US participation in the peace effort.[83] In addition, Irish America had long served as a base of financial and weaponry support for the PIRA and Sinn Fein. Here was one of their heroes from Ireland coming to the US for the first time. There was no doubt that organizations such as NORAID gave him a warm welcome.

            Gerry Adams’ visit to the US provided a catalyst to the peace process. Prior to the trip, the British and Irish Governments were locked in a stalemate with Sinn Fein. The Downing Street Declaration had stalled over Adams’ request for clarification. Britain was disappointed in Sinn Fein’s delaying tactics and angered over the continued attacks orchestrated by the PIRA. Unionists were also applying pressure on Britain to break ties with Ireland and do away with the Downing Street Declaration all together. With so much at stake each group was trying their best to display a strong front. Britain had to demonstrate to the Unionists that small concessions to the Nationalists could yield peace. Yet at the same time the PIRA and Sinn Fein had to demonstrate that they were not surrendering by maintaining an unrelenting campaign. This situation put both groups at an impasse with each unwilling to concede.

            Enter the US with its sudden acceptance of Gerry Adams’ visa. The entrance of the US into Northern Ireland’s politics shifted the political board around and forced proponents of the Downing Street Declaration to adjust. The British had to factor in a new form of unbridled support for PIRA/Sinn Fein from Irish America. Previously Britain was confident that they were beating the PIRA. New possibilities offered by Irish American support appeared to breathe new life into the PIRA.[84] Ireland had to account for the new voice of Irish Americans. The new Nationalists would play a significant role in applying pressure on all parties. However, this situation also worked against the PIRA. While they were getting major benefits from the US, especially the new ability to actively raise funds, these benefits came with strings attached. The PIRA and its political wing Sinn Fein had to demonstrate that they were willing to negotiate peace talks. One example was the promises given in the US by the Connolly House Group. In a document titled “Policy Statement by Irish American Leaders” the group pledged to commit to a campaign to end all visa restrictions, create a representative office in Washington D.C., and stimulate corporate investment in Northern Ireland only “in the event of a cease-fire.”[85] President Clinton also provided another incentive for a ceasefire by granting Joe Cahill and Pat Treanor, two PIRA veterans, visas to the US. Adams stated that these incentives definitely would “test whether we [PIRA/Sinn Fein] could deliver.”[86] The PIRA delivered. On August 31, 1994 the PIRA announced a complete cessation of military operations.[87] But an added caveat at the end of the announcement hinted at future difficulties: “We note that the Downing Street Declaration is not a solution, nor was it presented as such by its authors. A solution will only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations.”[88] Shortly afterwards, the Loyalist paramilitaries under the newly organized Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) declared a ceasefire on October 13, 1994. Like the PIRA, the CLMC had a specific condition for continuing their ceasefire, “The permanence of our ceasefire will be completely dependent upon the continued cessation of all nationalist/republican violence, the sole responsibility for a return to War lies with them.”[89] This statement too lead to further problems down the line during the peace talks.

Decommissioning Controversy

            The first major hurdle for peace negotiations was decommissioning weapons. After the ceasefires, there was a flurry of activity as governments strove to keep their promises to Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein was invited to Ireland to formally meet the Irish Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds, for a proposed “Forum for Peace and Reconciliation.”[90] Afterwards Gerry Adams had another trip to the US for second rally of support from Irish Americans. During the Sinn Fein excursion to the states the Loyalists declared their ceasefire. Peace appeared to be just on the horizon until decommissioning came up. The idea behind decommissioning PIRA weapons was introduced after the ceasefire discussions. Sinn Fein saw decommissioning as a sideshow. Gerry Adams described the row over decommissioning as the British “strategy of stalling the [peace] process through the deliberate erection of barriers and … attempting to create and sustain a crisis around the issue of IRA arms.”[91] However, he forgot to account for political pressures that forced Prime Minister Major towards arms removal. As a leading member of the Conservative Party, Major had to appear strong on terrorism. Even though peace talks were underway the PIRA could not publically be given an easy time. To do so would make the Unionists, with their long history of siding with the Conservative Party, furious. Unionists were already speculating over possible apocalyptic PIRA schemes. Adding to the tension, the Conservative Party was facing a major scandal around the time of the peace talks.[92] Major, now more than ever, needed the Unionist votes to bolster his party.

            The British were adamant on decommissioning and brought it up again on March 7, 1995 in the Washington Conference. Sir Patrick Mayhew, Britain’s Northern Ireland deputy, listed the three prerequisites the PIRA had to fulfill before Sinn Fein would be included in all-party talks: the PIRA “must agree in principle to disarm; there must be agreement on how to go about it; and there must be a ‘confidence-building’ measure, a token gesture of disarmament to begin the process.”[93] To no surprise the PIRA flat out refused to accept Britain’s “Washington three” prerequisites. The bickering over the issue continued for several months and the talks appeared to be at a standstill. Once again President Clinton stepped in to break the impasse. He publicly announced that his first visit to Northern Ireland would be on November 30. Neither the British nor Irish Governments “wanted a stalled peace process … to tarnish the prestige of an American presidential visit.”[94] Both governments strove desperately to find a way around decommissioning. However, by now the British had solidified their stance on requiring decommissioning. For Major to publicly back down now would make him appear conciliatory and bring forth Unionists fury. The Irish Government compromised by offering a “twin-track” approach. The solution was to have an Independent International Commission that would review the issue of decommissioning, while the all-party talks were underway. Thus, decommissioning was still left on the table, although the International Commission, instead of the British would oversee it.

            The International Commission in charge of decommissioning would be chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell, Canadian General John de Chastelain, and former Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri. From December 1995 to January 1996, the Commission received numerous submissions from various individuals, groups, and companies about The Troubles. After reviewing all the materials, the Commission released its report on January 22, 1996. The report called for political groups involved in all-party talks to affirm their “absolute commitment: a. to democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; b. to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations; c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission; d. To renounce any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations.”[95] The report clearly outlined that violence would lead to a rejection in all party talks and that decommissioning was due for the paramilitaries on both sides. However, the decommissioning of weapons was not to occur prior to all-party negotiations, but during or after the negotiations. Another third party group would be in charge of verifying the mutual destruction of weapons. The Independent Body’s rejection of decommissioning prior to peace talks was a blow to Prime Minister Major, who was relying on the issue to win Unionist support. This rebuff was evidence of the US growing role in Northern Ireland.

Mitchell Report Illustrates US Compromise and Unionist Trust

            Though the Mitchell Report removed decommissioning prior to peace talks, it was also edited to provide specific statements to please political groups. For example, even though Major failed to achieve prior-decommissioning, he benefited from the International Body’s refusal to decommission government weapons. The Mitchell Report stated, “Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by paramilitary organizations. We accept and share that view.” This statement supported the British Government, in the face of heart-wrenching letters from the families of those killed by the security forces and loyalists. One lady from Newry writing about the death of her husband stated, “My suffering has come as a direct result of the guns of the British Army, our suffering has continued as a direct result of the “establishments” callous treatment and disregard for our feelings.”[96] Another letter from a father in Newry describes how “British held and British back weapons” of the Loyalists Red Hand Commandos killed his fourteen year old son.[97] These submissions by individuals, though heartfelt, could not broaden the commission’s purview beyond paramilitary weapons.

            The obvious benefit Sinn Fein gained from the removal of prior decommissioning was that the PIRA did not have to surrender their arms for Sinn Fein to be included in the all-party talks. Even though decommissioning still remained, the Mitchell Report stated, “The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.” This sentence was important to the PIRA since, as a matter of pride, they refused to completely surrender to the British. For them, the struggle since 1923 had never come to an end. The report went even further when it stated, “Parties should have the option of destroying their weapons themselves.”[98] Even better! Now the weapons would not even have to be confiscated by government authorities. Instead the PIRA would be allowed to destroy their own weapons under the supervision of a verifying commission to keep their political prestige.

            For more moderate political parties such as the SDLP the removal of the gun from politics was all they dreamed for. Years of sectarian violence had muddled the political civil rights basis of the Northern Ireland Conflict. The tit for tat killings and the attacks on the British security forces made reforms and reconciliation close to impossible. There was a “sense of disillusionment” and “a sense of fatalism” among the population.[99] The ceasefires changed the entire situation. “For nearly a year and a half the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland.”[100] With the silence of the guns came the prime opportunity for peace as John Hume had envisioned it, one with socio-economic reforms and reconciliation. The Mitchell Report’s wording looked promising for moderates with its claim that, “a resolution of the decommissioning issue - or any other issue - will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.” At long last an official who was not out to demonize the opposition.

            Unionists benefited from the continued ceasefire that brought Northern Ireland a respite from the explosions and gunfire that terrorize its inhabitants on an almost weekly basis. However, their greatest worry was how long the ceasefire would last. Their worries were noted in the Mitchell Report, “Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, threaten to use force, to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree.” For some Unionists, especially the hardliners, the very presence of the Mitchell Commission was evidence of the PIRA’s successful coercion. Despite the negative view of the Mitchell Commission by hardliners, the submissions from Unionists to the Commission illustrated the trust that the Independent Body enjoyed. One Unionist submission counter arguing Sinn Fein’s allegations, discredited the comparison of Northern Ireland to South Africa and urged the Commission to place the maximum accountability of the conflict on the “paramilitaries and their apologists.”[101] The writer clearly believes in the International Body as he has spent a considerable amount of time writing out a concise letter to the Commission. Another example of the Unionist support for the International Body is the organizational submission by political parties regarding decommissioning. Unionist parties, even the most extreme hardline ones, all submitted reports about decommissioning. To top it all off, the CLMC even provided a letter to the Commission promising, “The CLMC will not initiate a return to war. There shall be no first strike.”[102] All parties wanted to explain their viewpoints to an International Body that they believed would make a difference.

US Influenced Peace Talks – Evidence of Successful Diplomacy

            The sudden revival of peace negotiations under the duress of a presidential visit highlights the powerful influence of the US over the British and Irish governments. With recent developments of the peace process mostly propelled forth by American meddling, the British were unable to dominate the peace negotiations. American support for Sinn Fein threatened Britain’s usual role of setting the course of the discussions. Previously Britain took the nominal high ground and wait, knowing that there were no other third parties to which Sinn Fein could turn except for Ireland. Ireland usually caved into British demands and towed the line by refusing to negotiate with Sinn Fein. Regardless of fierce British opposition, the US continued to provide Sinn Fein with benefits time and time again.

            Ireland fared no better. Through its various Prime Ministers the country had negotiated with the British as representatives of the Nationalist community. However, despite Ireland being the “origin” of the IRA and the Catholics in Northern Ireland, it actually held very little influence over the Nationalists in the North. More often than not behind the televised meetings and public photos, Irish representatives clashed with Sinn Fein members. Gerry Adams’ distrust of the Irish Government is easily visible when he states, “History told us that the Irish Government could not be relied upon. That had been the experience since partition.”[103] Indeed both British and Irish Governments not only had close to no control over Sinn Fein and the Nationalist community, but also had hardly any influence on each other.[104] This major weakness of both Prime Minister John Major of Britain and Prime Minister John Bruton of Ireland created a power vacuum for the US to step in.

            US dominated peace talks did not grant free reign to Sinn Fein. Rather, the US kept Sinn Fein chained to the peace talks through Irish American influence. Despite all claims to the contrary, Sinn Fein is the political wing of the PIRA, which is a terrorist paramilitary group. The PIRA is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of military personnel and civilians.[105] This violent organization has proven its capabilities with a sophisticated arrangement of weapons ranging from improvised explosive devices to heavy machine guns. Thus, the US supported the twin tracks program as alternative even though it still left decommissioning on the table.

            Surprisingly, Gerry Adams mentions little criticism of the US International Body on decommissioning in his book, A Farther Shore. According to Adams, most of the culpability for the decommissioning chaos lies with the unreasonable British and traitorous Irish Governments. Adams even goes as far as to criticize the Catholic Church for its incessant hypocritical pleas of peace.[106] In contrast, the US officials are presented in a positive light throughout the book. This positive presentation of the US is because the huge benefits provided by Irish America. Clinton lifted restrictions on public donations to Sinn Fein in 1995, allowing the party to host its first fund raising event on March 12, 1995.[107] The fund raising event was estimated to have raised more than twenty-thousand dollars. These proceeds added to the larger donations provided by large corporate sponsors. In addition to funds, Irish America provided a base of moral support for Sinn Fein. Many among the Irish Americans were staunch Republicans and enthusiastically in favor of Sinn Fein. Irish American funds and public support bolstered Sinn Fein and the PIRA at a time when they were weak. By the 1990s the strategy of the “Armalite and Ballot box” had placed the PIRA in a vulnerable position. The “Armalite” or armed struggle was faltering as the RUC Special Branch and its allies were winning the twilight war through intelligence gathering spies.[108] The ballot box had placed Sinn Fein responsible to its Nationalists voters who were tired of conflict. Increasing its support amongst the Irish Americans added further pressure towards peace talks because US condoned donations were contingent on the PIRA sticking to the peace agenda. Not pursuing peace discussions ran the risk of losing wonderful cross-Atlantic benefits. Therefore despite multiple breaches of ceasefire agreements during the peace negotiations, Sinn Fein soldiered on.

            The US had a significant difficulty influencing the more extreme Unionists. Unionists were vital to the peace process because their presence held the British on Northern Ireland. Their close proximity to Ireland and years of PIRA campaigns made them suspicious of any peace discussions and third parties. While the British could be swayed by former Anglo-American Cold War relations and the Irish could be won over through Irish America, the US lacked a strong political connection to the Unionists. To make matters worse, the US promotions of Sinn Fein state side projected the US as a Nationalist friendly entity. Thus, whatever opinions forming we bound to be view through the Unionist anti-Nationalist mindset. The hardline Unionist antagonism towards the US is evident in Mitchell’s early meeting with Ian Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party and David Trimble of the Ulster Unionist Party. David Pozorski, State Department liaison for Mitchell, recalls that both Paisley and Trimble wanted Mitchell to “pack his bags and go home, this wasn’t going to work, he was pro-Irish.”[109] This hostility was repeated during the all-party discussions where hardliners aimed to curb Mitchell’s role in the all-party talks. Again the DUP and UUP were aiming to prevent what they viewed as a pro-Irish chairman presiding over the peace talks.[110] When both the DUP and the UUP failed to get Mitchell’s powers diminished, they walked out at Mitchell’s first peace conference.[111] To get the Unionists to participate, the US had to apply pressure on the British who themselves put pressure on the Unionists. While this succeeded in a creating compromise with the David Trimble and the UUP, the need to constantly push forward against hardline Unionist opposition frustrated the pace of the peace talks.

            Not all Unionists are hardliners and not all Protestants are Unionists. Indeed there was a thread of liberalism present in Ulster, evident from the earlier Prime Minister Terance O’Neill. During his premiership O’Neill took great interest in reconciling the Catholic-Protestant divide through reforms. Although his reforms failed and hardliners eventually rose to power, O’Neill did have significant number of supporters. During the explosive rise in tensions, O’Neill gave a speech pleading for the “people, whatever their denomination, to attend their places of worship on Sunday next to pray for the peace and harmony” of the country.[112] In the following weeks nearly 150,000 people signed messages or declarations endorsing the sentiments of the television speech. These supporters, the silent majority, are the more moderate citizens of Northern Ireland. As the conflict went on more radical messages of Unionism overtook the moderates. This sidelining of moderates in the Protestant/Unionist community strikingly mirrors the PIRA hijacking of original NICRA goals. US promotion of democratic ideals and peace appealed to these quiet, moderate Unionists.

            Apart from the US ability to pressure participants, the country also benefited from its view as an overall neutral entity. Sinn Fein definitely viewed the US in a positive light. Gerry Adams visit to the US provided moral and material support for the PIRA and Sinn Fein. In addition, President Clinton stepped forward to provide impetus to the peace talks during periods of what Sinn Fein believed to be “British stalling.” The Irish viewed the US as a perfect peace-making advocate. Their support for in the International Commission is evident from articles in the newspapers. One article in the Irish Times titled, “Chairman Mitchell has a reputation for tenacity,” described Mitchell’s characteristics as an example of why he is suitable for chairing the International Body.[113] His “patience, liberalism, legalistic fair-mindedness and intellectual seriousness” are qualities that article highlights as perfect for his new role. Another article from The Cork Examiner titled, “Man who holds the key to lasting peace slips quietly into Derry,” clearly illustrates the large amount of respect Mitchell was given. The article even demonstrates Mitchell’s has support from the British when it states “He [Mitchell] is held in high esteem by the British.” To further emphasize the Mitchell’s impartiality the paper quotes him saying, “Never did I decide a case before I heard the evidence. I think if you make a decision first and then look at the evidence you’re not likely to get as good a decision.”[114] The Unionists were split on their opinion on Mitchell. While Ian Paisley and the DUP kept to his anti-Irish agenda, David Trimble and the UUP were willing to discuss decommissioning with Mitchell. Trimble’s willingness to come to the discussions highlights how the former US Senator was accepted by the UUP as a fair judge of character. Even Paisley’s DUP that vehemently tried to sideline Mitchell was willing to submit a report to the International Body.[115] The wide number of submissions appealing to “Senator Mitchell” exemplified the positive US image.

Violence During the Peace Talks

            Despite the fair nature of the Mitchell Report, the progress of the peace negotiations was significantly impeded by PIRA impatience with long drawn out negotiations. On June 17, 1996 the PIRA exploded a car bomb in Manchester causing more than two hundred million pounds in damages.[116] The event put Sinn Fein at odds with the pledge in the Mitchell Report to use “exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues.” As a result, Sinn Fein was excluded from all-party talks. Gerry Adams, as always, attempted to exonerate Sinn Fein from the PIRA’s actions by claiming that the groups were separate autonomous entities.[117] In the face of terrorism, the British Government was less willing to discuss possible peace options.

            Nevertheless, the peace talks continued. An election was held on May 30 in order to determine participation in the talks. The results indicated that ten groups would participate in the talks: UUP, SDLP, DUP, Sinn Fein, Alliance, UK Unionist Party (UKUP), Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC), and Labour. The top four groups with the most votes in order from most to least were UUP (24.17%), SDLP (21.37%), DUP (18.80%), and Sinn Fein (15.47%).[118] On June 10, 1996 the nearly all-party talks opened under the chairmanship of George Mitchell.[119] However, the exclusion of Sinn Fein left the talks quite hollow. The PIRA had “returned to the gun” leaving the year of 1996 a return to chaos. Multiple times the peace talks appeared on the verge of completely breaking down and Mitchell was placed in the difficult position of trying to keep the peace negotiations going without all parties present. His patience and skill were put to the test and he delivered. Despite the barrage of criticism from the media, Mitchell was able to hold the peace discussions at a time when peace was nowhere in sight. Some in the media even backed Mitchell as evident by sympathetic titles such as “George not to blame if he goes for one-way ticket” or “Mitchell’s lesson in the art of patience.”[120] Orange parade riots, shootings, and bombings continued until 1997 when a general election brought the “New Labour” Party to power. The new Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and new Secretary of State, Dr. Maureen ‘Mo’ Mowlam, continued the peace talks and pledged, “Those who use or threaten violence will be excluded from the Government of Northern Ireland” and “prisoners kept in unless violence is given up for good.”[121] Keen on the release of fellow PIRA prisoners, the PIRA declared its second ceasefire on July 19, 1997. With the ceasefire came Sinn Fein’s inclusion into the all-party peace talks. The work of diplomacy was finally proceeding forward.

            Then disaster struck. On December 27, 1997 a member of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) killed Billy Wright of the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) as he sat waiting for a van.[122] Although the CLMC and PIRA had both declared ceasefires, other separate groups such as the INLA and the LVF had not. The death of Wright set off a chain of tit for tat killings that shattered the ceasefires of the CLMC and PIRA. Both groups were drawn back into a bloodbath. For breaking the principles of the Mitchell report, the UDP and Sinn Fein were both suspended from the all-party talks. Once again the peace talks were in the gutter. Mitchell recalled that early 1998 was a dark period that left him feeling “particularly discouraged.”[123] He then decided to set a specific deadline to prevent the all-party talks from disintegrating. The deadline for the peace talks, the 9^th of April, was agreed to by all parties even the suspended UDP and Sinn Fein.

            After some skillful persuasion by Mowlam, the UDP held together and was reinstated in the all-party talks. Sinn Fein was also reinstated after the PIRA toned down the killings. With both the CLMC and PIRA back to standby mode the peace talks began once again. In the background the LVF and INLA were waging their own war, as they were not included in the ceasefire agreements. The 30^th of March, Monday marked the beginning of intense negotiations. From March 30^th to April 10^th, there was a whirl of paperwork as all the parties endeavored to complete the peace negotiations on time.[124] Everything was up for review: North-South border policies, arms decommissioning, prisoner releases, economic trade matters, voting procedures, and other government functions.

            The US continued to play a critical role in the final stages of the peace process. As chairman, Mitchell reviewed a massive amount of paperwork being put into the agreement. He also wrote several possible drafts of the agreement. Gerry Adams recalled discussing with Mitchell about his role in the peace talks. Mitchell said, “My job is about facilitating agreement. The Agreement itself is up to the two governments and the parties involved.”[125] This statement reflected Mitchell’s crucial role of making sure that party submissions were acceptable additions to the Agreement. Thus, the final Agreement had to satisfy the major parties involved. Clinton was doing his duties as well. He telephoned Adams at around 1:00 AM and again at 5:00 AM to discuss the issue of releasing prisoners.[126] Serving as a facilitator, Clinton applied pressure on both Adams and the British to ensure that the discussions would not remain stuck on the topic of prisoners. Yet at the same time he served as a support for Sinn Fein when he pledged that the “USA was ready to help.”[127] Another time, Clinton phoned David Trimble to urge the UUP to agree to the power-sharing executive. Mitchell and Clinton also had their own dialogues to discuss the possible ways to encourage cooperation.

Good Friday Agreement and Concluding Remarks

            At 5:00 PM a plenary was convened for the final deliberations over the Agreement. On April 10, 1998 after days of bickering over the details, all parties signed the Belfast, Good Friday Agreement. However, there was the additional problem of now getting the people of Northern Ireland to vote for it. On May 22, 1998 dual referendums were held, one in Northern Ireland and one in Ireland.[128] The result: a seventy-five percent yes vote. The Good Friday Agreement had passed.

            The agreement was the culmination of efforts by British, Irish, Unionist, Nationalist, paramilitary, and American leaders to bring an end to a long and bloody conflict. On the British side John Major, Tony Blair, and Maureen Mowlam each played a pivotal role in the peace process. John Major laid the path to peace by agreeing to an International Commission. Under extreme pressure from within his own party to terminate the talks at an early stage, Major held out. Tony Blair helped lead Britain through the final stages of the peace talks. He continued to support the International Body and offered incentives for the PIRA to declare a ceasefire. On the last days of the peace talks, he served as a major facilitator for Unionist parties. Maureen Mowlam kept the UDP in the peace talks by convincing Loyalists in prison that the talks were not selling out the Union.[129] She further acted as a warm and accessible initiator during the peace conference.

            On the Irish side Prime Ministers Albert Reynolds, John Bruton, and Bertie Ahern, all contributed to the final Agreement in different ways. Albert Reynolds set the stage with his joint declaration with John Major.[130] By precluding the International Commission, the Downing Street Declaration provided the basis for compromise. The document’s wording of “consent” was to show up again in the Good Friday Agreement. John Burton continued the work of his predecessor. He compromised with John Major to push the peace talks past decommissioning. Bertie Ahern provided the support needed during the final stages of the peace talks. He and Blair, both physically came in person to Stormont to hash out the wording of the final Agreement.[131]

            Unionist leaders David Trimble, Augustus Spence, and John White, long reactive to even the slightest whiff of Nationalist reforms, played the crucial of bridging the gap between Unionists and Nationalists. Augustus Spence and John White, both former men of the gun, turned towards peace. Without their efforts it was unlikely that the Loyalists would ever consider a ceasefire. David Trimble represented the Unionist party with the most votes in the 1996 elections. He took the ultimate gamble on April 10, 1998 at 4:30 PM by “going for it [the Agreement].”[132] Trimble was vital to the Good Friday Agreement, without his assent the whole process would have been all for nothing.

            Nationalist leader John Hume strove for peace since the beginning of The Troubles. He advocated for democratic principles and was a participant in most the peace talks prior the Good Friday Agreement. The Anglo-Irish Agreement that led to the later Downing Street Declaration bears some his ideas.[133] His work with Sinn Fein and abroad with the US laid the foundations of the final peace agreement.

            Gerry Adams for his part brought the PIRA and Sinn Fein to the negotiating table. His advocacy for politics placed him at odds with the abstentionist policy of the PIRA. However, eventually the ballot box won out over the Armalite. Sinn Fein too would rise to become a major player in Northern Ireland politics displacing other political groups such as the SLDP. As a political representative for the PIRA, Adams helped to negotiate the ceasefires. Without the ceasefires the peace talks were sure to fail. His commitment to the final Agreement helped end the military conflict.

            President Clinton and George J. Mitchell started the peace process and held it together at critical junctures. Clinton started it all with the new policy in Northern Ireland. With the complex web of political interactions it seemed unlikely that a peace process would ever take off without a radical change to the situation. Therefore, Clinton granted Gerry Adams a visa to the US. The trip brought the Sinn Fein leader back into public view. In addition, Adams’ trip also moved other governments and political parties towards negotiating with Sinn Fein. Clinton’s visit to Northern Ireland was also another successful ploy to push forward negotiations past decommissioning. Mitchell acted as an impartial chairman on the decommissioning commission. His Mitchell Report helped to press forward the severely impeded peace talks. As a chairman of the peace conference, he appealed to multiple different parties and made sure that the Agreement could satisfy all the different political groups. In the last leg of the journey, Clinton reappeared during the negotiations with his telephone calls. The pressure and support he provided help to finalize Sinn Fein’s support of the Good Friday Agreement.   

            The Good Friday Agreement was the final accumulation of multiple efforts. However, US neutrality and strength paved the way for the peace talks. Under its auspices, harmony and tranquility moved from the realm of possibility to reality. There are still more turbulent times to come for the country. Decommissioning has only been somewhat addressed. The power sharing executive continues to struggle with reconciliation of past. But, the Good Friday Agreement has brought a measure of peace to Northern Ireland.

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---

[1] Peter Taylor, Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein, [Rev. & Updated American Ed.] (New York: TV Books, 1997).

[2] Ronald Terchek, "Conflict and Cleavage in Northern Ireland," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 433 (1977): 47-57.

[3] National Archives, “Ulster,” National Security Council. https://archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.1633583 (accessed 4/15/2016).

[4] National Archives, “Ulster,” National Security Council. https://archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.1633583 (accessed 4/15/2016).

[5] "Henry VIII." In The Concise Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, edited by Livingstone, E. A.. : Oxford University Press, 2013. http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199659623.001.0001/acref-9780199659623-e-2667.

[6]James Trager, "1537," In James Trager, The People's Chronology, 3rd ed. (Detroit: Gale, 2005), Gale Virtual Reference Library (accessed April 18, 2017).

[7]Hiram Morgan, "Nine Years War," In The Oxford Companion to Irish History. : (Oxford University Press, 2002) http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199234837.001.0001/acref-9780199234837-e-1348.

[8]Hiram Morgan, "Ulster plantation," In The Oxford Companion to Irish History. : (Oxford University Press, 2002) http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199234837.001.0001/acref-9780199234837-e-1925.

[9] "Siege of Derry," In The Oxford Companion to Irish History, edited by S. J. Connolly. : (Oxford University Press, 2002) http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199234837.001.0001/acref-9780199234837-e-524.

[10]Peter Taylor, Loyalists: War and Peace in Northern Ireland (New York: TV Books, 1999), 17.

[11]J. A. Cannon "Battle of the Boyne," In The Oxford Companion to British History. : (Oxford University Press) http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199567638.001.0001/acref-9780199567638-e-571.

[12]Jack Holland, Hope against History: The Course of Conflict in Northern Ireland, 1st ed, (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), 11.

[13] Ken Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors: The Government and Misgovernment of Northern Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 170.

[14] Fionnuala McKenna, “Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922,” CAIN: Government Reports and Acts: Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), September 01, 2016 (Accessed May 16, 2017) http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/spa1922.htm.

[15] A. C Hepburn, "Civil rights movement," In The Oxford Companion to Irish History. : (Oxford University Press, 2002) http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199234837.001.0001/acref-9780199234837-e-329.

[16] RTÉ archives, “March Marks the Beginning of The Troubles 1968.” http://www.rte.ie/archives/2013/1004/478333-civil-rights-march-in-derry/ (accessed 4/14/2017).

[17] Taylor, Loyalists, 56-57.

[18] The PIRA grew out of a split in the original IRA, more discussion further on. Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 33.

[19] Battle of the Bogside (2004), Vinny Cunningham, https://vimeo.com/32340356, 07:30.

[20] RTÉ archives, “Funeral of Samuel Devenney.” http://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1042-northern-ireland-1969/1047-growing-tension/320379-funeral-of-samuel-devenney/ (accessed 4/15/2016).

[21] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 71.

[22] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 85-86.

[23] O'Doherty, Cahir. "John Hume: Irish Peacemaker." Irish Voice (New York, N.Y.), March 02, 2016.

[24] Battle of the Bogside (2004), Vinny Cunningham, https://vimeo.com/32340356, 03:20.

[25]Stephen Badsey, "Anglo-Irish war," In The Oxford Companion to Military History. : (Oxford University Press, 2001) http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198606963.001.0001/acref-9780198606963-e-62.

[26] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 81.

[27] Peter Taylor theorizes that either the soldiers wanted to avoid being caught in the middle of a sectarian fight or that the soldiers did not have enough manpower. Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 94.

[28] Colm Campbell, and Ita Connolly, "A Model for the 'War against Terrorism'? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew," Journal of Law and Society 30, no. 3 (2003): 341-75.

[29] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 102-103.

[30] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 74.

[31] No Go – The Free Derry Story (2006), Vinny Cunningham, https://vimeo.com/33123680, 32:20.

[32] No Go – The Free Derry Story (2006), Vinny Cunningham, https://vimeo.com/33123680, 34:10.

[33] No Go – The Free Derry Story (2006), Vinny Cunningham, https://vimeo.com/33123680, 34:30.

[34] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 82.

[35] Burn, Jamie. "Partition in Ireland." Hindsight, January 2008, 14+. General OneFile (accessed May 16, 2017).

[36] RTÉ archives, “The Taoiseach on the Situation in the North 1969.” http://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1042-northern-ireland-1969/1048-august-1969/320416-broadcast-by-an-taoiseach/ (accessed 4/15/2016).

[37] Battle of the Bogside (2004), Vinny Cunningham, https://vimeo.com/32340356, 42:40.

[38] Ken Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors: The Government and Misgovernment of Northern Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 134.

[39] The Ulster Volunteer, (2016) Ulster's Solemn League and Covenant pledge, Digital Repository of Ireland [Distributor], National Library of Ireland [Depositing Institution], DOI: 10.7486/DRI.g445cd95s.

[40] J. Brian Garrett, "Ten Years of British Troops in Northern Ireland," International Security 4, no. 3 (1979): 80-104.

[41] Garrett, “Ten Years of British Troops in Northern Ireland,” 83.

[42] Elliot, R. S. P., and Hickie, John. Ulster, a Case Study in Conflict Theory. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972., 44-45.

[43] Paisley and his followers “greeted” the Irish Prime Minister by throwing snowballs at his car. Rebecca Black, "In his own words... Ian Paisley on key political moments, the Catholic Church and throwing snowballs at Jack Lynch," BelfastTelegraph.co.uk, January 11, 2014 (Accessed April 20, 2017) http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/in-his-own-words-ian-paisley-on-key-political-moments-the-catholic-church-and-throwing-snowballs-at-jack-lynch-29906883.html.

[44] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 57.

[45] Terence O'Neill, Ulster at the Crossroads (London: Faber, 1969), 63.

[46] No Go – The Free Derry Story (2006), Vinny Cunningham, https://vimeo.com/33123680, 38:20.

[47] Ken Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors, 170.

[48]Alvin Jackson, "Chichester-Clark, James, Lord Moyola," In The Oxford Companion to British History. : (Oxford University Press) http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199567638.001.0001/acref-9780199567638-e-949.

[49] Taylor, Loyalists, 22-24.

[50] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 79-80.

[51] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 104.

[52] The Eight Federal Census of the United States: 1860 (Washington, D.C.: R. Armstrong, 1863), 609.

[53] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 104.

[54] "Vietnam War," In Gale Encyclopedia of U.S. Economic History, 2nd ed., edited by Thomas Riggs, 1414-1418. Vol. 3. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2015, Gale Virtual Reference Library (accessed May 3, 2017).

[55] Michael A. Genovese, "Watergate Scandal," Encyclopedia of U.S. Political History, edited by Thomas S. Langston, vol. 6: Postwar Consensus to Social Unrest, 1946 to 1975, CQ Press, 2010, pp. 406-410. Gale Virtual Reference Library (Accessed 3 May 2017).

[56] Gerhard Peters, and John T. Woolley. "Jimmy Carter: Northern Ireland Statement on U.S. Policy. - August 30, 1977." The American Presidency Project. 1977, (Accessed May 01, 2017). http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8014.

[57] David McKittrick, Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women, and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1999), 1473-1474.

[58] Victoria King, "Files show US-UK tensions over Northern Ireland in 1979," BBC News, December 30, 2009. (Accessed May 01, 2017), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8418150.stm.

[59] King, Files show US-UK tensions over Northern Ireland in 1979.

[60] Leonard Buder, “F.B.I. in City Arrests 4 in Plots to Export Arms to I.R.A. Units,” New York Times, June 22, 1982, sec. B3.

[61] Associated Press, “F.B.I. Reports Arrest In an I.R.A. Gun Case,” New York Times, April 28, 1985, 34.

[62] "FBI hail major blow to IRA." Times [London, England], July 15, 1989. Academic OneFile (accessed May 4, 2017).

[63] Federal Bureau of Investigation, Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts Section, Lady Diana, Princess of Wales, File Number 185-HQ-2171 (New York, New York, 1989), https://vault.fbi.gov/Diana%2C%20Princess%20of%20Wales/Diana%2C%20Princess%20of%20Wales%20Part%201%20of%201

[64] Alvin Jackson, "Anglo-Irish agreement," In The Oxford Companion to British History. : (Oxford University Press), http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199567638.001.0001/acref-9780199567638-e-142.

[65] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 281-290.

[66] "Sinn Féin." In Europe Since 1914: Encyclopedia of the Age of War and Reconstruction, edited by John Merriman and Jay Winter, 2350-2353. Vol. 4. Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2006. Gale Virtual Reference Library (accessed May 5, 2017).

[67] Gerry Adam’s book, A Farther Shore, describes how Sinn Fein adopted a more active political presence during the 1980s. Gerry Adams, A Farther Shore: Ireland's Long Road to Peace 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2003).

[68] The death of Bobby Sands provided a “field day” for Irish America and brought in money and support for the PIRA. Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 259.

[69] Office of the Attorney General. "Firearms Act, 1925 Permanent Page URL." Firearms Act, 1925, Section 21. Accessed May 03, 2017. http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1925/act/17/section/21/enacted/en/html#sec21.

[70] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 184.

[71] Fionnuala McKenna, "ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 1985 between THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM," CAIN: Events: Anglo-Irish Agreement – Document, September 01, 2016 (Accessed May 03, 2017) http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/aiadoc.htm.

[72] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 335.

[73] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 365.

[74] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 367.

[75] Adams, A Farther Shore, 98.

[76] Adams, A Farther Shore, 76-77.

[77] Ciaran Mullan, “Joint Declaration on Peace: The Downing Street Declaration, Wednesday 15 December 1993,” CAIN: Events: The Downing Street Declaration - Document. September 01, 2016 (Accessed May 02, 2017).

[78] Adams, A Farther Shore, 144.

[79] Brendan Lynn, “British Response to Sinn Fein Request for Clarification of the Joint Declaration on Peace: The Downing Street Declaration, (19 May 1994)” CAIN: Events: British Response to Sinn Fein Request for Clarification - Document. September 01, 2016 (Accessed May 02, 2017).

[80] Martha W. Healy, "WILLIAM J. CLINTON PRESIDENTIAL HISTORY PROJECT INTERVIEW WITH NANCY SODERBERG." Miller Center. May 10, 2007 (Accessed May 03, 2017) https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/interviews-with-the-administration/nancy-soderberg-oral-history-foreign-policy.

[81] Adams, A Farther Shore, 152-153.

[82] Adams, A Farther Shore, 155.

[83] Adams, A Farther Shore, 154.

[84] The number of deaths for the security forces was in decline reflecting the new British strategy of Ulsterisation and intelligence operations. McKittrick, Lost Lives, 1473-1474.

[85] Adams, A Farther Shore, 171.

[86] Adams, A Farther Shore, 175.

[87] Taylor, The IRA and Sinn Fein, 399.

[88] Adams, A Farther Shore, 178.

[89] Ciaran Mullan, “CLMC Ceasefire Statement 13th October 1994,” CAIN: Events: Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) Ceasefire Statement – Document, September 01, 2016 (Accessed May 02, 2017).

[90] Adams, A Farther Shore, 182.

[91] Adams, A Farther Shore, 195.

[92] "Britain's Major Is in the Mire as Ethics Campaign Stumbles," Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), (Date Accessed: 2017/05/05) www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

[93] Holland, Hope against History, 201.

[94] Holland, Hope against History, 203.

[95] Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, 22 January 1996, Box 864, [Decommissioning], M202.7.2 Commission Documents, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[96] Letter to the International Body, Box 864, Submissions by Individuals, M202.7.2 Commission Documents, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[97] Letter to the International Body, Box 864, Submissions by Individuals, M202.7.2 Commission Documents, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[98] Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, 22 January 1996, Box 864, [Decommissioning], M202.7.2 Commission Documents, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[99] R. S. P. Elliot, and John Hickie, Ulster, a Case Study in Conflict Theory, 122.

[100] Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, 22 January 1996, Box 864, [Decommissioning], M202.7.2 Commission Documents, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[101] “Apologists” clearly refers to Gerry Adams and other Sinn Fein leaders. Letter to the International Body, Box 864, Submissions by Individuals, M202.7.2 Commission Documents, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[102] Combined Loyalist Military Command Belfast, Box 863, Senator Mitchell’s briefing book, M202.7.2 Commission Documents, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[103] Adams, A Farther Shore, 175.

[104] Major and Burton’s Weakness Exposed, 24 December 1995, Box 865, M202.7.3 Press Clippings and Recordings, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[105] McKittrick, Lost Lives, 1484.

[106] Adams, A Farther Shore, 9.

[107] Pam Belluck. "Sinn Fein's Leader Raises Funds in U.S. for First Time." New York Times (1923-Current File) (New York, N.Y.), March 13, 1995.

[108] Holland, Hope against History, 191.

[109] Martha Pope, and David R. Pozorski, Interview by Brien Williams, George J. Mitchell Oral History Project. GMOH 175, November 30, 2009.

[110] Unionists will strive to curb Mitchell’s position, 11 June 1996, Box 885, M202.7.3 Press Clippings and Recordings, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[111] AP Report, 12 June 1996, Box 885, M202.7.3 Press Clippings and Recordings, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[112] O’Neill, Ulster at the Crossroads, 146.

[113] Chairman Mitchell has a reputation for tenacity, 6 December 1995, Box 865, M202.7.3 Press Clippings and Recordings, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[114] Man who holds the key to lasting peace slips quietly into Derry, 1 December 1995, Box 865, M202.7.3 Press Clippings and Recordings, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[115] DUP Letter Expulsion Request of Sinn Fein, 12 September 1997, Box 910, Rule 29, M202.7.2 Commission Documents, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[116] IRA admits it blew heart out of Manchester, 20 June 1996, Box 885, M202.7.3 Press Clippings and Recordings, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[117] Adams, A Farther Shore, 251.

[118] Election Held on 30 May 1996 Overall Result, 30 May 1996, Box 863, Senator Mitchell’s briefing book, M202.7.2 Commission Documents, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[119] Ken Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors, 95.

[120] George not to blame if he goes for one-way ticket, 22 June 1996, and Mitchell’s lesson in the art of patience, 4 July 1996, Box 885, M202.7.3 Press Clippings and Recordings, George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections & Archives, Bowdoin College.

[121] Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors, 107.

[122] Taylor, Loyalists, 244.

[123] Taylor, Loyalists, 245.

[124] Adams, A Farther Shore, 330.

[125] Adams, A Farther Shore, 345.

[126] Adams, A Farther Shore, 347.

[127] Adams, A Farther Shore, 351.

[128] Taylor, Loyalists, 252-254.

[129] Taylor, Loyalists, 246.

[130] Taylor, Loyalists, 225.

[131] Refer to Ahern by George J. Mitchell. Taylor, Loyalists, 248-249.

[132] Holland, Hope Against History, 218.

[133] Holland, Hope Against History, 137.