The
Cold War between the United States and its NATO counterparts against the Soviet
Union and its allies of the Eastern Bloc was one huge battle of ideals. The
West with its ideals of democracy and liberty fought against the East with its
ideals of state communism and welfare. Yet despite the strong antagonism, the
two sides never had a full out war with each other. The idea floating about was
that outright war with nuclear arsenals would lead to the destruction of both
parties. A closer look into this concept illustrates the uninspired imagination
of its adherents. Thermonuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union would
not lead to the imminent destruction of both. Rather American strategists
envisioned a superior US world position in the aftermath of a bloody war. The
only thing lacking was the moral and public support for a confrontation with
the Soviet Union. Therefore, a legitimate justification for war was to come to the
protection of another country under attack by the Soviets. In this preventative
war to defend liberty, Americans expected to first out nuke the Soviet Union
and second, dissolve the Soviet Union with popular support.
Fighting The Cold War Myth
The
issue of war between the United States and Soviet Union is often imagined, but
not expected. Common perception of US-Soviet relations was that mutually
assured destruction (MAD) would prevent an outbreak of war. The idea is that “Any
act of nuclear aggression by one party would trigger a retaliation that would
destroy both.”[1] Center
to the theory of MAD was the creation of nuclear weapons. Previous explosives were
capable of a moderate amount of destruction when amassed in large scale. However,
the US development of nuclear weapons under the Manhattan Project brought forth
a new level of devastation previously unseen in history. The destructive
capabilities of the atom were witnessed first hand at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945. A new atomic era ushered in the rise of US to superpower status. Unfortunately
for the Americans, the Soviets were close behind. Using intelligence from their
espionage rings in the US, the Soviets developed their first atomic device and
tested it in 1949.[2] With
both sides of the Cold War now armed with nuclear weapons the consequences of
an all-out war would be disastrous for world.
The
problem with this vision of MAD that raves on about the possible nuclear apocalypse
is that it undermines the human will to live. The migration out of Africa has
spread humanity to the furthest corners of the globe. From the harsh cold of
the Himalayas to the warm tropics of the pacific, humans have adapted to the diverse
environments of the world. For thousands of years humanity has coped with
natural disasters, famine, disease and war. Despite these difficulties, human
beings have persevered and will likely continue to do so in the face of a
nuclear war. Looking at the past, there have been many apocalyptic imaginations
of an end to humans. A nuclear apocalypse would not be the first time that
technology has been hypothesized to cause the end of the civilization.
Previous
declarations of a destructive apocalypse were shown to be false, further
illustrating human ingenuity and tenacity. Thomas Malthus determined that
humanity would reach its carrying capacity in the near future and be unable to
sustain high rates of growth. His theory centered on the idea that the human
birth rate would increase faster than food production. As the population grew
to unsustainable levels, it would no longer be able to provide adequate
sustenance for a majority of society. This lack of basic necessities would in
turn cause society to descend into a whirlwind of warfare, disease, and famine.
Such Malthusian predictions sprung up again during the 1960s with the incoming
food crises in the developing world. Cynics and pessimists waxed on and on
about the failures of science to rescue the millions of impoverished beings.[3] Writers
like Paul Ehrlich imagined eco-catastrophes that would devastate local life. Turns
out that Green Revolution did succeed in providing a greater harvest. In fact,
humanity’s population continues to expand to even greater heights, going into
the billions.
In
the realm of warfare, stories of advance technologies wrecking the foundations
of civilization are present as well. World War I was critical in displaying both
the capabilities of modern armies and of nation states. Trench warfare was
terrible and gruesome with army casualties climbing into the hundreds of
thousands. Yet the nations of Europe managed to retain some semblance of
civilization and continued to pour more troops onto the battlefield. Some economists
believed that the world markets had become so interconnected that a war was
close to impossible.[4]
Even if a war did breakout, they were confident that it had to be short because
modern nations could not bear the economic and resource burden for too long. Thus
the economists were astounded when the war continued on for four long years sucking
up resources at an astonishing rate. Even towards the war’s end as the pillars
of nations began to buckle or outright collapse in some countries, civilized
societies continued to exist.
The
mutually destructive fears of the World War II, extrapolated from the technologies
of World War I, were determined to be false too. Chemical and aerial warfare was
thought to bring an apocalyptic horror unlike any other upon the civilian
population of both sides. To a certain extent these fears did come true. The
German Luftwaffe bombed London during the Blitz. Allied bombings of German
cities later in the war wrecked similar havoc on the civilian population.[5] However,
the bombings did not bring the imagined end of society and government as
depicted in the H.G. Wells inspired movie, Things
to Come. Rather the governments of countries involved in World War II persevered,
verifying the inaccuracy of the MAD theory.
It
was this faulty MAD theory that was centerpiece of the US minimum deterrence
policy. The Encyclopedia of Military Science defines deterrence as “The
persuasion of one’s opponents that the costs and/or risks of a given course of
action outweigh the benefits”.[6] In
the context of the Cold War, nuclear weapons were to serve as a “risk” tool to discourage
Soviet aggression. Of course this deterrence worked both ways since the Soviets
also had a nuclear arsenal. The resulting political situation was a stalemate
where neither side could gain the upper hand over the other. Since the MAD
theory had such dangerous consequences, both the US and Soviet Union were discouraged
from taking aggressive action. Even simply having these weapons of mass
destruction should be sufficient enough to frighten the opposing side into
inaction. There was one problem with this “layman” view of minimum deterrence.[7] Nuclear
weapons were assumed to be a “menace to mankind” with unlimited destructive
capabilities.[8] Instead
of focusing on the possible limits of damage, the general public focused on the
horror stories. These horror stories in turn, generated a belief that the risks
of thermonuclear war are high enough to warrant ignorance on other military
postures and plans. However, there are significant flaws in that line of
reasoning.
Deterrence
applies only when adequate war preparations have been made. Without the early
warning of a nuclear strike, the nation under attack could be damaged before any
retaliatory action takes place. Such a scenario disproves the idealistic view
of minimum deterrence. An ideal situation is that launching nuclear weapons
trigger an automatic retaliatory action. The reality is that the first one to attack
will have a significant time advantage. The attacker has the benefit of prior
preparation via stockpiling munitions and evacuating cities. They also can
concentrate their firepower at discrete targets while the defender has to protect
the entire area. Thus, the overwhelming advantage lies on the side initiating
nuclear war.
Preparing for War
Once
past the fear mongering horror stories of imminent ruin, logical plans can be
studied in detail. There are two major war preparations that would benefit the
defender: efficient air defenses and a civil defense program. This need to
improved defenses does not contradict the statement of the attacker’s advantage
in the previous section. The one initiating thermonuclear war still has the
advantage of early preparation. However, effective defenses will make sure to
minimize possible damages. Such claims may seem as little value in the face of
nuclear weapons where even one bomb is capable of wiping out a city. Even so, defenses
do serve a purpose. The previous logic can be flipped around. Preventing even
just one plane will help save a city. Civil defense projects will also protect
the local population from the hazards following a nuclear attack.
With
the rapid advancement of missiles in the 20th century, improved air
defenses can feel pointless. Missiles travel faster than intercepting aircraft
making them difficult to shoot down. Active air defenses on the ground likewise
have similar problems targeting a projectile going many times faster than the
speed of sound. However, there are distinct disadvantages to using Inter
Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Missiles are an expensive investment
requiring considerable expertise to maintain and operate. They also cannot be
recalled once fired and are more inaccurate compared to conventional bombers.
Thus, bombers serve as a cheaper attack method.
Bombers
are not only cheaper, but they are also available in large quantities for use
in both nuclear and conventional bombings. Both the US and Soviet Union field large
air forces that are likely to play a pivotal role throughout the war. Air
defenses are therefore central to repulsing aircraft. Doubtless, air defenses
will not be impenetrable. Looking into the past at World War II demonstrates
the massive difficulties of defending large targets such as cities. It would be
exceedingly optimistic to assume that in the age of missiles and advance
aircraft that air defenses would be effective at preventing air attacks. Herman
Kahn highlights the general outlook out effective air defense as “an almost
hopeless task.”[9]
Despite
their questionable effectiveness, air defenses contribute to the war effort in
preventing successful bombing runs. Anti-aircraft artillery fire prevents
bombers from flying freely over targets without evasive maneuvers. Complex
maneuvers and deception are thus needed and complicate the enemy’s job. Active resistance
prevents accurate bombings and forces the enemy to use high performance
aircraft. The bombing loads of the enemy aircraft will be reduced for more
maneuverability. Thus, while the enemy aircraft are likely to bomb cities, they
will do so with less devastation than expected.
A
program of civil defense is the second preparation that benefits the defender. This
program comes in the form of nuclear fallout shelters, evacuation, food
stockpiles, inventory, and recuperation cadres. Center to the civil defense
plan are the shelters. For the nation’s wealth comes from its people. Therefore,
the military is also responsible for protecting life because people are not
very productive when ill or injured. The construction of these protective
infrastructures has to be coordinated into public evacuation measures. With
sufficient drilling and practice, towns and small cities can be evacuated quickly.
Once within the protective shelters, the population needs sufficient,
uncontaminated food supplies. These foodstuffs should be prepared right after
the construction of the shelters so as to use untainted agriculture and
produce.[10]
The food stockpiles will be developed along with inventory for the other
necessities of life. Inventories will vary depending on the each regions needs.
The last vital aspect of the civil defense program is an organization of work
cadres specifically aimed at recuperation and construction. Work cadres serve as
onsite recovery tools for repairs of infrastructure and other vital machinery. With
all these civil defense measures in place and an active air defense to provide
some sort of cover, the estimated casualties can be expected to drop by at
least 30 million.[11]
The
problem is that these programs are expensive and cannot be easily pushed
forward without considerable backing from the public. There is also the added
problem of political support needed behind these massive government-spending
operations. A bipartisan split within the government complicates the task of getting
a sufficient budget for each part of the program. It is more than likely that
certain aspects of the program will be diminished or completely removed to
compromise clashing party ideals. Critical to getting unanimous approval is an
international crisis with the Soviet Union. Unless there is an active threat
present at that moment, the financial support behind such efforts is bound to
be limited.
Starting the War
The
expected outbreak of World War III reflects off the bias of Western visions. The
primary instigator is expected to be the Soviet Union. However, the first to
use nuclear weapons will be the US. This peculiar situation appeases both the
victory and morality imaginations of the West. The Soviets get the stain of
being the one morally responsible for starting a war resulting in the death of millions,
while the Americans get to gloat in their heroic triumph over the evil forces
of Communism.
Soviet
aggression comes in the form of physical violence towards nonaligned countries
or separatist Eastern bloc countries. In Collier’s “Preview of the War We Do
Not Want” the country under Soviet attack is Yugoslavia.[12] This
October issue of the magazine depicts Marshal Tito as brave dictator opposing
the evil plans of a power hungry Stalin. Of course, the event is presented as
one of Soviet subterfuge. Soviet spies slip into Yugoslavia’s capital, Belgrade
to assassinate Marshal Tito. The assassins fail, but not before sowing chaos
and confusion throughout the country with rumors and a communications blackout.
In amidst the chaos, the satellite puppet states of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary,
and Albania invade Yugoslavia. Behind them on the border on the Soviet Union are
15 army divisions at the ready. The plan was that the satellites would be used
to capture Yugoslavia, thus portraying the incident as an internal affair. Marshal
Tito’s survival foiled the operation right away. Once communications were
restored, Tito broadcasted Stalin’s nefarious plot to take Yugoslavia. The West
recognizes Yugoslavia’s legitimate fight against the Soviet juggernaut and
rallies to its aid with America leading the way. The countries of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in conjunction with the US all commit
openly to opposing Soviet aggression. The other countries of the United Nations
(UN) also join in the support of Yugoslavia with the exception of the
nonaligned states.
The
chain of events depicted in the magazine has some historical precedent. For one
it is rather telling that the Balkans area is once more the source of another
World War. The battle between Serbia and Austro-Hungarian Empire was what set
off the First World War. Now the battle between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union
is what is envisioned to begin the Third World War. The source of the conflict,
Marshal Tito’s disagreement with Joseph Stalin, was also quite well known. As a
result of not following the party line towed by the Cominform, Yugoslavia was
expelled from the group in 1948.[13] The
relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia after the split remained
frosty and the threat of outright war was present. It was based on these
hostile foreign relations that the writers of the Collier’s visualized the outbreak
of the next World War.
World War III – Thermonuclear War
Once
the war against the Soviet Union is formally announced, the US performs a
massive nuclear weapons strike. The switch from defense to offense is required
to effectively win. While the Soviets have the advantage of numerical
superiority, the Americans have the advantage of a superior quality air force
and a larger nuclear stockpile. Thus, a quick strike will effectively utilize
early American advantages. The Soviets had miscalculated, believing that the
Western forces would remain clear of the “internal affair.” The US capitalizes
on the early surprise by launching early air attacks on Soviet Union. Missile
use is limited because the US can rely more on its fleet of bombers rather than
ICBMs.[14]
The
early nuclear strikes are aimed at military targets, not civilian targets. Besides
the usual moral reasons as described in Robert E. Sherwood’s “The Third World
War,” there is also a cold logic behind targeting military objectives.[15]
Herman Kahn classifies this plan to attack military targets only as “straight
counterforce.”[16] By
striking at the Soviet’s military capabilities, the US can damage and reduce
the retaliation force. As a result, the Soviet military response to the US
strikes will be significantly diminished. Straight counterforce also has the
added benefit of being more “humane.” American leaders can espouse their moral
superiority to their citizens by justifying nuclear strikes against dangerous
enemy weapons. Sherwood exploits this idea fully in his article when he states,
“We were not at war with the Russian people … therefore, as humanly possible,
we aimed at strategic targets only.”[17] Another
more sinister reason to leave civilian targets untouched is to use them as
hostages. Kahn places this factor above the others, as he believes that the
hostages are vital to preventing retaliation and gaining political concessions.[18] Obviously
such nefarious purposes for avoiding civilian centers do not make for good
propaganda. Hostage taking is frowned upon both domestically and on the
international stage. Therefore it is likely that media accounts and writers
will quickly skim over the real benefits of targeting military installations.
The
success of nuclear strikes raises questions about the Soviet nuclear
capabilities. If the Soviets have nuclear weapons of their own, what is to
prevent them from using them first? There are a variety of reasons that Soviets
avoid using nuclear weapons first in the conflict. One, the “internal affair”
of Yugoslavia was to be dealt without utterly ruining the country. Yugoslavia,
though opposed to the Stalinist line, was still a socialist country. They were
potential allies that had to be “persuaded” to return to the Soviet Union. Two,
the Soviets were surprised by the American and Western support of Yugoslavia. Stalin
was expecting the invasion of Yugoslavia to be an entirely internal issue that
the West would ignore. Marshal Tito was not completely a reliable ally of the
West either. He was a supporter of socialist democracy and also responsible for
founding the nonaligned movement that sided with neither the Americans nor the
Soviets. To begin with, it would seem unlikely for the West to come to aid of Communist
country. When the West did come to the aid of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union was
caught unaware. Three, the Soviets genuinely believed in a policy of not
striking first with nuclear weapons. After World War II, the Soviets
continually stressed the language of peace.[19] Although
the authenticity of the Soviet designs for peace remain suspect, there is
certainly room for plausibility. World War II, also known as the Great
Patriotic War for Russians, caused horrific damage to the Russian economy.
Entire populations were displaced. Factory production had to be relocated. The
Russian casualties went into the millions. In the wake of such a destructive
war, a plea for peace was reasonable. Indeed the Soviet citizens wholeheartedly
threw their support behind the 1950 Stockholm Declaration, which called for a
universal ban on atomic weapons.[20] The
Party line was similar. Yevgeniy N. Kochetkov, first secretary of the USSR Embassy
in Washington DC, stated that the “Soviet Union has officially renounced first
use of nuclear weapons.”[21]
Rather
than use nuclear weapons the Soviets are more likely to turn to conventional
warfare. Here the Soviet armed forces have the numerical superiority on the
land and air. Using this force of numbers, Soviets will sweep into Europe like
a tidal wave. Another Soviet detachment is expected to aid North Korea in its
invasion of South Korea. There will be some pockets of heroic resistance by UN
troops. However in the grand scheme of things, the Red Army is expected to win
most of early military confrontations. UN forces would be pushed out of Western
Germany under incessant attack from the larger Soviet air force. A similar
situation occurs with the evacuation of UN forces from Korea to Japan, referred
to as “Dunkerque” in the Sherwood’s Colliers’ story.[22] Soviet
troops will probably even invade American soil with amphibious landings in
Alaska.
The
involvement of conventional armed forces runs counter to Kahn’s imagination of
thermonuclear war, but can be predicted to occur considering the size of armed
forces of both nations and the emotions of the populations. Kahn imagines a
short war lasting from “a few hours to a couple of months at most.”[23] His
vision of a thermonuclear conflict is one of limited exchanges and tactical deployment
of the nuclear weapons. These short limited engagements are to be ended by
political peace arrangements made by both superpowers.[24] The
problem is that Kahn approaches the issue of thermonuclear war as a
rationalist. He assumes that both the Americans and Soviets are logical players
in a war game of annihilation. Once the war production and momentum starts to pickup,
the citizens of both superpowers will demand for total victory on behalf of
those killed. The governments on both sides of the divide have to justify the war
losses and casualties. In an effort not to lose face it is likely that neither
superpower will step down. Thus, the war would continue indefinitely with the both
sides tossing nukes at each other. Here is where the conventional ground troops
come in. To hold land and defeat an enemy, infantry have to perform two acts.
They must search for the enemy forces and destroy them. Another objective is to
find and destroy the enemy’s main war industries. Even when armed with terrifying
nuclear stockpiles, both sides have to disable or remove the opponents’ abilities
to produce more. The task is to be left ground troops to permanently destroy war
production and prevent recovery attempts. Therefore, the use of conventional
forces in conjunction with nuclear strikes is fated to occur.
The
Soviet pledge to not strike first with nuclear weapons did not advert the
trauma of thermonuclear warfare. For the vow is broken the moment the Americans
strike first using nuclear weapons to bomb Soviet military bases and
installations. The Soviets, anticipated in being more bloodthirsty in their military
endeavors, target both large civilian populations and strategic targets. Kahn
refers to this policy of mixed targets as “counterforce plus countervalue.”[25] It
is more than likely that the Soviets will use their missile development
advantage to compensate for the poor quality of their aircraft. The missiles
are not as accurate, but are more than adequate to target large cities. The
ICBMs could be used to target industrial or financially important cities like
Detroit and New York. While the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans provided some sort
of natural barrier for the US, the new technologies of the Cold War were to
diminish their protective encirclement. Soviet bombers from Siberia drop the
first nuclear weapon on the US at Hanford, Washington. Hanford was a US
production site for nuclear weapons during the development of the atomic bomb
under the Manhattan Project.[26]
Once
the battle starts to reach the US mainland, American political issues come in
the middle of foray. Politics are generally depicted as a burden or inconvenience
to military realities. The American public is described as complacent because
of their safe position on another continent far from the war zone. This
complacency reflects off the population’s World War II experience where the US
mainland was left relatively unscathed. Politicians represented the public’s opinions
by not investing enough funds into military expenditure and civil defense. As a
result, when the Russian nuclear bombs struck the American public was caught off-guard.
The devastation wrought by the nuclear weapons brought in by foreign enemies in
the skies above convinced the American public of the need for national and
civil defense. New funds were quickly diverted towards shelter infrastructure
and evacuation management.
Now
with both sides are using nuclear weapons, the war divulges into a nuclear face
off with the Americans using straight counterforce and the Soviets pursuing a
policy of counterforce plus countervalue. Soviets will continue their city nukings.
The Americans will try to avoid attacking cities in preference for strategic
military targets. However with the terror and damages caused by Soviet nuclear
weapons, the US military establishment will eventually be forced by public
demand to nuke Moscow.[27] The
Americans will have the upper hand in this nuclear weapons battle because of
their larger nuclear stockpile and their successful early nuclear strike. The
early US strikes damaged nuclear weapon production factories preventing the
Russians from creating more. Although numerically superior, Soviet forces will
over extend themselves and eventually be exhausted after fighting for months on
end. Then the anticipated counter attack will begin with UN forces opening up
with menacing salvo of explosives.[28] With
newfound momentum, the allies will press forward until they reach the Russian
border.
The
US strategists pictured a massive campaign of psychological warfare alongside
the general counteroffensive. Once the momentum was back on the side of UN
forces, aircraft would start to drop leaflets informing the Soviets people of
their opposed enslavement at the hands of the Soviet state. Simultaneously,
agents and saboteurs would be parachuted into Soviet Union to promote
resistance to Russian rule. It was believed that once the populace of Eastern
bloc countries were given the opportunity they would overthrow their
oppressors.[29] From
these domestic uprisings, the countries of Warsaw Pact would break away from
the Soviet Union. The chain would continue until the Soviet Union disintegrated.
What was left of the country would become the new Russia.
The
US dreams of a Cold War escalation saw Americans play a vital role in defending
the liberties of peoples from Soviet tyranny. In this particular case, the US
came to the defense of a nonaligned nation. A preemptive strike on Soviet
strategic facilities such as military installations and industrial factories crippled
the Soviet war effort. Major Russian population centers were avoided for moral
and tactical reasons. However, this successful strike would not be enough to
hold back the numerically superior Russian forces invading from the East. Soviets
retaliated by using their preexisting nuclear arsenal against US cities and
military installations. Thermonuclear warfare brought a terrible maelstrom of
death and destruction like none other. Americans were able to survive and learn
from the initial onslaught. With reenergize conviction, Americans threw their
lot into the war effort. Likewise the UN forces counterattacked and pushed back
the overextended and exhausted Soviet forces. With the war coming into the
countries of the Eastern block and a new concerted UN psychological warfare
campaign taking off, the enslaved peoples revolted against their Soviet
oppressors. As each country separated from the Soviet Union, the entire Communist
edifice disintegrated into multiple pieces. The world was finally rid of Soviet
oppression, but the road to recovery was to be long and arduous. America along
with its allies would lead the path of recovery for the formation of new
democracies and a new Russia.
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race." Oxford Reference. 19 Nov. 2016.
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195123715.001.0001/acref-9780195123715-e-83.
[2] Richard
Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1986)
[3]
Michael Rawson, Come the Apocalypse, PPT.
[4] I.
F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War, 1763-1984 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1966), 77.
[5]
The most infamous Allied bombing of the European war was the firebombing of
Dresden.
[6] Sidney
Pash, "Deterrence." In Encyclopedia of Military Science,
edited by G. Kurt Piehler, 473-476. Vol. 2. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Reference,
2013. Gale Virtual Reference Library (accessed November 19, 2016).
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[7]
Herman Kahn refers to this idea of minimum deterrence as “the layman’s view.”
Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 2nd
ed. (New York: Free Press Paperback - The Macmillan Company, 1969), 8.
[8]
Clarke, 197.
[9]
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 2nd
ed., 101.
[10]
Kahn estimates a cost of $25 billion for a three year food supply with
rationing methods in place (about $204 billion in today’s currency value).
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 2nd
ed., 517.
[11]
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 2nd
ed., 98.
[12] Robert E. Sherwood, Hanson W. Baldwin,
Lowell Thomas, Arthur Koestler, Walter Winchell, Allan Nevins, Edward R.
Murrow, Hal Boyle, Stuart Chase, J. B. Priestley, Margaret Chase Smith,
Senator, Erwin Canham, Philip Wylie, Howard Brodie, Walter Reuther, and Chesley
Bonestell. "Preview of the War We Do Not Want: Imaginary Account of
Russia's Defeat and Occupation, 1952-60." UNZ.org, October 27,
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[13]
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[14]
Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable, Discus Book, DS34 (New York: Avon, 1971), 62.
[15]
Robert E. Sherwood, “The Third World War,” Collier’s,
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[16]
Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable,
69.
[17]
Sherwood, 69.
[18]
Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable, 70.
[19] Timothy
Johnston, Oxford Historical Monographs :
Being Soviet : Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life under Stalin 1939-1953, (Cary,
GB: Oxford University Press, 2011), 141-145.
[20] Stephen
Lovell, The Shadow of War ; Russia and the USSR, 1941 to the Present,
(Chichester, West Sussex, U.K. : Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 149-151.
[21] Kochetkov,
Yevgeniy N. "The Position of the USSR on Nuclear Weapons and Arms
Control." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 469 (1983): 136.
[22]
Sherwood, 29.
[23] Herman
Kahn, On Escalation : Metaphors and Scenarios (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1986), 168.
[24]
Kahn, On Escalation, 34-36.
[25]
Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable,
68-69.
[26]
Rhodes, Chapter 2.
[27]
Sherwood, 70.
[28]
Sherwood imagines UN forces to strike with a barrage of nuclear artillery.
Sherwood, 31.
[29]
Sherwood, 77-78.
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